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43 ReferencesExecutive Summary
Economic incentives in Kazakhstan have been radically reshaped since the Soviet era ended in 1991.
In the first phase of transition, the economy and agricultural sectors declined by 40-50%. Overall
economic growth refused in 1996, and agriculture is likely to enter a recovery phase soon. The
economy of Kazakhstan is undergoing rapid structural change, and agriculture is experiencing
strong inter-sectoral competition. The change to market-oriented and commercially-driven
agriculture has altered fundamentally the incentives faced by Kazakhstan’s wheat farmers. They
have reduced use of inputs sharply because of the need to pay market prices for fertilizer, fuel, and
other inputs, while severely curtailing investment in machinery and their farms generally. There is
considerable potential for productivity improvements and adoption of new technologies in the
wheat production and marketing sectors. Farmers are likely to resume investment only slowly and
are likely to adopt only those changes that are low cost and which are based on low-input methods
of production. Assessed under 1998 conditions, these wheat growing methods are about 20% more
competitive than the energy and input-intensive technologies of the Soviet era. Because of the new
commercial pressures brought on by the opening of the Kazakhstan economy to global markets, the
production methods of the Soviet era are no longer relevant to Kazakhstan’s wheat farmers. A
fundamental change of thinking and approach to the situation faced by farmers is required in
research, extension, training and education. The new commercial  circumstances of agriculture call
for strategic analysis of the future for Kazakhstan’s farming and of related policies, research and
education. Action is required in these areas to reinvigorate Kazakhstan’s agriculture, and programs
should commence as soon as possible. The future for wheat in Kazakhstan is promising, providing
there is concerted and strategic change in the mindsets, culture, and approaches of those working in
and supporting the wheat industry.
ivAcknowledgments
This study was undertaken with a visit to Kazakhstan in September-October 1998 and a visit to
CIMMYT Mexico in January 1999. The authors would like to acknowledge the following (in order
of first meeting during the study): Dr Muratbek Karabayev, CIMMYT Office, Kazakhstan; Dr
Alexei Morgounov, CIMMYT Kazakhstan; Zhanar Kaliyev, Translator; Dr Azimchan Satybaldin,
National Academic Centre for Agrarian Research (NACAR); Dr Sadyk Baktyar, NACAR; Professor
A.I. Abugaliev, NACAR; Professor Saparov Abdulla Saparovich, NACAR; Academician Dr Gany
A. Kaliyev, Kazak Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics (KSRIAE); Professor
Rachim A. Urazaliev, Kazakhstan Agricultural Research Institute; Dr Z.D. Ismhambetov,
Kazakhstan Agricultural Research Institute;  Dr Geshtovt Yuriy Nikolaevich, Kazakhstan
Agricultural Research Institute; Dr T.L. Nurmuratov, Kazak Scientific Institute of Plant Protection;
Zhapar A. Zhambakin, KazAgroCo-op, National Private Farmers’ Federation of Kazakhstan; Vice-
Rector Sabit B. Baizakov, Kazak State Agrarian University; Dr Ayup R. Iskakkov, Kazak State
Agrarian University; Director A.A. Ramanazov, Marketing, Investment and International
Cooperation Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Republic of Kazakhstan;  Director Khalilov Y.
Mamadovich, Strategic Planning and Socio-Economic Reform Department, Ministry of
Agriculture, Republic of Kazakhstan; Altay K. Duyseneev, Grain Union of Kazakhstan; Altai
Kasimovich Duiseneev, Grain Union of Kazakhstan; Boris I Kasunov, Akmola Association of
Farmers; Dr Akilbek K. Kurishbayev, A.I Baraev Kazak Institute of Cereal Production; Dr Kanat
Akshalov, A.I Baraev Kazak Institute of Cereal Production; Dr Ivan A. Vasko, A.I Baraev Kazak
Institute of Cereal Production; Dr Kamishnik L. Dmitrievich, Kazak Grain Processing Research
Institute, Astana;  Academician Professor Issa O. Baitulin Kazakhstan Academy of Ecological
Reconstruction; Dr S.Z. Sundetov Astana Branch of KSRIAE; Larissa Shvitzova, World Bank
Librarian, Kazakhstan;  Chairman Serik Kerimkulov, Almaty Agro, Almaty Oblast Farmers
Association; Director Bolat Azhichamov, Kendau Company; Shaukat R. Hatovich, KSRIAE,
Almaty; Mogens Lemonius, COWI Consulting Engineers, Soborg Denmark; Academician Mekhlis
Suleimenov, ICARDA, Tashkent; Dr Mike Turner, Seed Unit, ICARDA, Syria; Dr Prabhu Pingali,
CIMMYT Economics Program, Mexico; Dr Michael Morris, CIMMYT Economics Program, Mexico;
Dr Erika Meng, CIMMYT Economics Program, Mexico; Dr S.A. Rajaram, CIMMYT Wheat
Program, Mexico; Dr Hans-Joachim Braun, CIMMYT Wheat Program, Turkey; Dr Ivan Ortiz-
Monasterio, CIMMYT Wheat Program, Mexico; and David Poland, CIMMYT publications unit.
Thanks also go to those who facilitated the study including Maria Luisa Rodriguez, CIMMYT
Economics Program, Mexico; Miriam Sanchez, CIMMYT Economics Program, Mexico;  Olga Y.
Metya, CIMMYT Outreach Program, Turkey.
v1
Changing Competitiveness of the Wheat Sector of Kazakhstan
and Sources of Future Productivity Growth
Jim Longmire and Altynbeck Moldashev
Introduction
Background
Agricultural production in Kazakhstan has declined sharply since 1990. There have been
major reductions in the livestock sector and the crop sector, especially for spring wheat.
From being a major net exporter of food products within the USSR during the 1980s,
Kazakhstan faces the prospect of being only just self-sufficient in food during 1998-99.
The Kazakhstan economy experienced serious economic contraction from 1990 to 1995.
Since then, the economy has slightly recovered, but it faces a major uncertainty with the
collapse of the Russian economy. The drought of 1998 has also slowed economic activity.
The transition from a socialist economy within the Soviet Union to a more open and
market-based economy has been difficult for Kazakhstan, as for most transition economies.
Kazakhstan’s people are unfamiliar with aspects of a market economy and this adds to
future challenges faced by the country.
Kazakhstan has a large land area and considerable opportunity for agricultural production
and exporting. Whether this opportunity can be realized will depend on a number of
factors, especially adapting to the new commercial circumstances faced and reinvigorating
the agricultural sector. This study is focused on those factors, especially as they relate to  the
changing competitiveness of wheat production in Kazakhstan. Of special interest is the
future for the wheat sector and how different research and development strategies may
affect that future.
Overview of Kazakhstan1
Kazakhstan is the most northerly of the Central Asian nations (Figure 1). It has vast steppe
lands and a society which blends Kazak and Russian cultures with lesser influences from
other European and Central Asian groups. Ethnic Kazaks represent around 50% of the
population and Russians just over 30%, with
many nationalities making up the remainder.
Kazak is the official language but Russian is
the lingua franca. Kazakhstan’s independence
was proclaimed on 16 December 1991. The
national currency is the Tenge.
Kazakhstan’s 16 million people occupy a
land area of 2.7 million square kilometers.
1 The primary source for this section is the 1998
Kazakhstan Annual Country Profile (Shorauly and











This is 40% larger than Mexico’s land area, about the same as Argentina’s and some 10%
less than India’s. Kazakhstan occupies almost 70% of the land of Central Asia but its
population makes up less than 30% of the region (Uzbekistan’s population being half as
large again as  Kazakhstan’s).  Kazakhstan’s physical features are dominated by the vast
steppes. There are three major inland seas (Caspian, Aral and Balkhash) fed by rivers in the
south. The rivers in the north flow into Western Siberia and on to the Arctic Ocean. Apart
from the Tian Shan mountain range along the southeast border with China and Kyrgyzstan,
and forest and mountains to the east, there are no major physical barriers along the
country’s borders.
Kazakhstan’s modern history is tied closely to that of Russia and the Soviet Union. Soviet
industrialization and development occurred strongly in Kazakhstan with the building of
many mines, industrial plants, railways, highways and cities as well as the plowing of the
steppe “Virgin Lands”. The development of large collective farms, or ‘agro-industrial
complexes’ was also a feature. Kazakhstan as a modern nation has inherited many
institutions and structures of the command economy of the Soviet Union.
The climate of Kazakhstan is depicted in Figures 2 and 3. These show the average monthly
temperature and average monthly precipitation for representative locations in northern and
southern Kazakhstan, respectively. Generally, annual precipitation is low (less than 300
mm) across much of the northern steppes. Precipitation is even lower in central and
southern arid areas. However, nearer the east and southern mountains,  precipitation
increases and this is reflected in Figure 3.
Some key development indicators for Kazakhstan are presented in Table 1. Generally, these
paint a picture of an economy which is urbanized, diversified and energy intensive. Most
development indicators compare favorably with other Central Asian nations and with low
and middle income countries of the world. Despite the generally favorable picture,
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Figure 2. Average monthly precipitation and
temperature, five locations of northern Kazakhstan.
Note: Total annual precipitation is 227mm. Mean annual
temperature is 1.6 degrees C. Locations are Astana,
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Figure 3. Average monthly precipitation and
temperature, two locations of southern Kazakhstan.
Note: Total annual precipitation is 531mm. Mean annual






This is the first economic study of Kazakhstan’s wheat sector supported by CIMMYT. To
some extent it is exploratory in nature. However, the specific objectives for the study are:
1. To assess the competitiveness of wheat in Kazakhstan with emphasis on the profitability
and possible expansion of wheat exports.
2. Identify future sources of wheat productivity growth, including an assessment of the
technologies in the shelf and in the pipeline.
3. Evaluate the constraints to technology development and adoption, including an
assessment of the education, research, and extension system.
4. Assess the current policy environment and identify the policy instruments that would
enhance wheat productivity growth.
5. To assess the agricultural research /education/extension system and provide
recommendations for strengthening it.
The study involved a three-week field trip in September-October 1998 and considerable
background research using international data sources. Some of the data obtained are
unlikely to have been seen outside the country before. Some other are simply a compilation
of information available from international agencies and data services.  Nevertheless, the
main developments concerning wheat, its competitiveness and potential for future
productivity have been distilled.
Table 1. Key development indicators for Kazakhstan, compared with other central Asian countries and all low-
income and all middle-income countries, latest available data (World Development Report 1998)
Kazak- Kyrgyz- Tajik- Turkme- Uzbek- Low Middle
Indicator Unit stan stan zstan nistan istan Income Income
GNP per Capita PPP-Based  US$  3,290  2,040  930  1,410  2,450  1,400  4,550
Population  million  16  5  6  5  24  2,048  2,855
Population Growth Rate  % p.a.  -0.4  0.7  1.8  3.4  2  2.1  1.3
Population Density Per Sq.km  6  24  42  10  55  65  40
Urban Population  %  60  39  32  45  42  28  49
Agricultural Share of GDP  %  13  52  n.a.  n.a.  26  31  12
Services Share of GDP  %  57  29  n.a.  n.a.  47  42  50
Trade Relative to of GDP  %  65  86  228  n.a.  69  42  52
External Debt % of GNP  14  37  24  18  9  n.a.  n.a.
Development Assistance % of GNP  0.8  13.9  5.6  0.5  0.4  3.5  0.4
Female Share of Workforce  %  47  47  44  46  46  36  41
Commercial Energy
Consumption per Capita  Kg oil equiv.   3,337   513   563   3,047   2,043   198   1,139
Carbon Dioxide Emissions
per Capita  Tons  13.3  1.2  0.6  6.3  4.3  0.7  3.7
Net Energy Imports % of total use  -16  41  60  -137  -6  -20  -37
Life Expectancy At Birth (yrs) Male/Female 60/70 62/71 66/72 62/69 66/72 58/60 66/71
Infant Mortality Rate Per 1000  30  36  38  50  35  113  43
Telephone Main lines Per 1000 people  118  75  42  74  76  11  78
Annual Freshwater Use % of  total  50.3  23.4  19  2280  504  n.a.  n.a
Source: World Development Report 1998.4
Agriculture in the Kazakhstan Economy
Changing Size of the Economy
Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had an average income per capita
(PPP-basis) which was about one quarter that of the USA, some 20% below Russia’s,
exceeding Ukraine’s and the highest of the Central Asian Republics (World Bank 1997,
Table 1). In 1987, countries with a similar average income per capita to Kazakhstan
included Brazil, South Africa, Jordan and Malaysia (op cit.).
Since independence, Kazakhstan’s economy has declined significantly (Figure 4). While
there has been some recovery since 1995, average income per capita remains well below
levels at the beginning of the decade. Other Central Asian nations have experienced similar
economic declines (Figure 5), as have other large countries of the CIS, including Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus (Figure 6).
Transition and Future Prospects
Considerable analysis has been undertaken of the causes of decline of output in the








1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Figure 4. Gross national product per capita,
Kazakhstan, 1989–1998, US$-Basis.









1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Figure 5. Gross national product per capita, Central
Asia, 1989–1998.













1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98
Figure 6. Gross national product per capita, Former
Soviet Republics and Bulgaria, 1989–1998.






Fischer, Sahay and Vegh 1998; Christoffersen
and Doyle 1998). A number of contributing
factors are proposed:
1. Disorganization of production, marketing
and trading links since independence
2. Inherited sectoral misallocations from the
Soviet system, including excessive capital
accumulation
3. Credit and investment contractions since
independence
4. Excessively high rates of inflation5
5. Short-run impact of structural adjustment programs
6. Measurement error.
The slight upturn in economic performance since the mid 1990s indicated that the worst of
the transition was over for economies of the CIS. However, the Russian economic crisis of
1998 has added considerable uncertainty to the immediate economic outlook. The latest
forecasts of the IMF for transition economies are summarized in Table 2. Major declines are
predicted for 1999 for Russia and Ukraine and these are likely to affect Kazakhstan’s rate of
growth (which the IMF did not forecast for 1999). Thus the immediate prospects for the
Kazakhstan economy are dimmed by the Russian crisis and its likely impact.
Table 2. IMF forecasts of real GDP 1997 to 1999,
transition countries
Annual percentage change in:
Real GDP Consumer Prices
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
Kazakhstan 2.0 -1.5 .. 17 8 8
Kyrgyzstan 6.5 6.0 4.6 26 12 10
Tajikistan 1.7 3.4 4.0 88 64 19
Turkmenistan -25.9 3.6 12.1 84 17 26
Central Asia and
Transcaucasia  2.2  2.1  3.1  31  20  12
Russia 0.7 -5.7 -8.3 15 26 56
Ukraine -3.2 -1.7 -3.5 16 11 32
Belarus 10.4 7.0 2.0 64 53 75
Bulgaria -6.9 5.0 3.7 1082 23 7
Romania -6.6 -5.5 -2.0 155 60 31
Source:  IMF, World Economic Outlook 1998.
Table 3. Key economic indicators for the Kazakhstan economy, 1989-1998
GNP per Rate of Index of T-Bill Exchange Foreign
Population Capita Inflation Employment Interest Rate Tenge Exports Investment
Year Million US$ % p.a.1 ‘93=100 Rates % p.a. per US$  US$ billion US$ billion
1989 16.6 2310 5.8 … … … … …
1990 16.7 2360 18.8 … … … … …
1991 16.9 2130 87.5 … … … … …
1992 17.0 1750 1710 … … … …   0.1
1993 17.0 1530 1370 100 …     2.6   4.21   0.5
1994 16.8 1240 1980   93.6 214.3   35.5   4.28   0.8
1995 16.6 1180 276   81.6   49.0   61.0   5.77   0.9
1996 16.5 1350 39   78.6   28.9   67.3   6.52   1.1
1997 16.4 1360 17   65.2   15.2   75.4   6.80   1.2
1998 16.3 1400 14   55.62   15.02   78.5   7.00   1.7
Source: World Bank, World Tables, IMF, International Financial Statistics, International Herald Tribune, Kazakhstan, 3 June 1998, Kim et al (1998).
1 The annual inflation rates are based on the implicit GDP deflator from 1989 to 1993. Thereafter they are based on the Consumer Price Index.
The 1998 figure is an estimate from the International Herald Tribune 3 June 1998.
2 Estimates based on mid-May 1998 figures.
For the long-term, Fischer, Sahay and Vegh
(1998) emphasize that the fast reforming
transition economies are likely to take about
20 years to reach the per capita income
levels of OECD countries. Kazakhstan is not
adjusting as rapidly as some transition
economies closer to Western Europe so a
long period of recovery from the economic
shocks of the 1990s may lie ahead.
Other Economic Developments
The broad indicators for the Kazakhstan
economy since 1989 are presented in Table 3.
Several points merit attention. First, there
has been a net emigration from Kazakhstan
of the order of 700,000 people since the
country’s population peaked in 1992. The
emigrants are mainly ethnic Russian.6
Second, inflation reached very high levels between 1991 and 1995 creating considerable
uncertainty in the economy. Since then inflation has declined considerably. In its early
years, the Tenge devalued rapidly against the US dollar and other non-CIS currencies. The
rate of devaluation has fallen considerably in recent years.
Third, exports have grown strongly since 1994 and this has contributed to economic
growth. Foreign direct investment has also grown strongly, more than doubling between
1994 and 1998.
Growth of industrial production for different sectors of the Kazakhstan economy between
1995 and 1998, 1st quarter is presented in Figure 7. The fuel and energy-intensive non-
ferrous metallurgy sectors have grown strongly when other sectors have declined to
varying degrees.  Major structural changes are occurring within the economy, driven
especially by growth in the energy sector.
Trade
Kazakhstan is an open trading economy. In 1996, trade as a share of GDP was 65% for
Kazakhstan (World Bank 1998). Kazakhstan’s trade has been strongly oriented to Russia
(Figure 8). Natural trade links are towards Russia to the north, north-east and west as well
as along traditional routes to Central Asia and western China. However, Russia’s economic
crisis of 1998 is likely to lead to Kazakhstan diversifying trade towards other markets.
Kazakhstan’s other major trading partners are in Western Europe, Central Asia, Eastern
Europe and other CIS countries. Central Asian trade is relatively small given the proximity
to Kazakhstan. The Central Asian economies are small in terms of total size of economy
(total GNP in 1996 of US$80 billion on a PPP basis) compared with Russia (US$ 620 billion),
other CIS countries (US$220 billion), Eastern Europe (US$ 630 billion) and Western Europe
(US$7760 billion).
The agricultural sector has a comparatively small share of total trade of the Kazakhstan
economy (Figures 9 and 10). Agriculture and food represent less than 10% of total trade of
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Figure 7. Growth of industrial production in
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Figure 8. Share of Kazakhstan's trade with other
countries, 1996.
Source:IMF, Distribution of Trade Statistics.
Exports
Imports7
1990s. In contrast, oil and gas’s share has grown rapidly. For example, oil and gas
condensate exports doubled in value (US$ terms) between 1995 and 1997 and
contributed 24% of total exports in 1997, compared with 16% in 1995 (Kazakhstan
Economic Trends 1998, p.41).
Agriculture in the Economy
Agriculture’s share of the economy in 1996 and 1997 was between 12-13% (World Bank
1997, Table 12 and 1998, Table 11). The dominant sector is services, whose share of the
economy in the same two years was 57%. The first five years since independence saw a
major structural change in the Kazakhstan economy. Estimates are that agriculture’s
share of the economy in the early 1990s was more then 25% (World Bank 1994).
Indices of total food production and of total agricultural production for Kazakhstan and
selected countries are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The declines in production appeared
to have ended about 1995. However, drought in 1998 and other adjustments have led to
another major decline.
Figure 9. Structure of exports of Kazakhstan, 1996–1997.










Figure 10. Structure of imports of Kazakhstan, 1996–1997.














Table 5. Index of agricultural production in
Kazakhstan, Central Asian and other Former Soviet
Union countries, 1992-1998
Index of Food Production 1989-1991=100
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Kazakhstan 112.8 98.1 83 66.8 64.4 63.8 54
Kyrgyzstan 101.6 95.3 87.4 81.7 87.4 86.2 88
Tajikistan 70 68.8 67.4 60.8 57.7 57.5 59.2
Turkmenistan 89.2 94.6 102.6 105 66.9 78 85.2
Uzbekistan 97.9 100 99.5 101.5 93.2 93 91.7
Russia 88.8 83.9 73.1 65.4 68.2 67.6 56.5
Ukraine 72.6 71.8 59.2 61.8 54.8 57.8 52.5
Belarus 77 78.1 59.8 58.8 59.9 59 59.8
Bulgaria 87.4 69.8 69 78 63.8 60.5 60.5
Romania 79.2 96.8 93.8 101.7 91.9 99.5 93.6
Source: FAOStat.
Table 4. Index of food production in Kazakhstan,
Central Asian and other Former Soviet Union
countries, 1992-1998
Index of Food Production 1989-1991=100
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Kazakhstan 115 99.5 84 67.4 65.5 65.7 55
Kyrgyzstan 103.3 95.3 91.1 88.5 96.8 94.3 95.6
Tajikistan 79.5 73.3 71.3 67.3 68.2 65.6 68.1
Turkmenistan 84.6 91.8 111.4 117.5 94.7 104.1 103.2
Uzbekistan 108.2 109.7 111.9 115.5 109.1 108.7 110.7
Russia 88.9 84.2 73.4 65.8 68.7 68.2 56.9
Ukraine 72.5 71.8 59.2 62 55.1 58.1 52.8
Belarus 76.9 78.1 59.7 58.5 59.8 58.9 59.7
Bulgaria 88 70.7 70.6 80.9 65 61 61
Romania 79.6 97.8 94.8 102.9 92.9 100.6 94.6
Source: FAOStat.8
Declines occurred in both the livestock sectors and the crop sectors. This is indicated by the
large falls in livestock numbers and in total cropped area (Figure 11). Total livestock
numbers fell by 55% from 1992 to 1998. Of this, intensive livestock (pigs, rabbits and
poultry) declined by more than 60%. The declines during the 1990s represent a major
downward adjustment of the farm sector overall.
Some scientists argue that the steppe lands had been degraded during the Soviet era and a
much lighter use of the land base was needed (Gossen 1998).  However, the adjustments
have been across livestock and cropping, especially intensive livestock. From 1990 to 1995,
domestic investment for the economy overall declined by an average 16% per year and
virtually ceased for many industries (World Bank 1997, Table 11). The lack of incentives to
invest during this era may have been a major factor behind agriculture’s adjustment. The
reduction in livestock numbers reflects a major drawing down of their capital stock,
boosting current consumption of meat at the expense of future output (Jarvis 1974). Net
trade in livestock products remained relatively steady during the 1990s indicating that
changes in livestock production were closely related to changes in domestic consumption of
livestock products.
Kazakhstan’s agriculture became much less intensive during the 1990s. This has meant
much lighter use of inputs on the land being cropped and lighter grazing pressure on
pastures. An indication of the reduction in use of inputs is that inorganic fertilizer use in
recent years has been about 20% of the 1990 level.  Kazakhstan was roughly self-sufficient in
fertilizer in the early 1990s but has become a net exporter in this item with the reduction in
use on farm (Figure 12). As well as fertilizer, farmers have cut back on other input use
drastically. Tractors, harvesters and other farm equipment have been receiving minimal
maintenance. There has been very little investment in farm machinery which generally is
aging and deteriorating.
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Figure 11. Total crop area and total livestock
numbers, Kazakhstan, 1992–1998.
Source: FAOStat. Total livestock number is calculated in Animal Units
(AUs) and includes all farm animals and poultry. An AU for a
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Figure 12. Production, use and trade in fertilizers,





Changing Structure of Farms2
Under the Soviet system, four types of farming entities existed:
(1) state farms (sovkhozes)
(2) collective farms (kolkhozes)
(3) household plots of rural families, mainly workers on (1) or (2)
(4) land plots of urban households (gardens and dachas).
In 1990 there were 2188 state farms and 402 collective farms. State farms averaged 80,000
hectares in area, of which 15,000 was arable. The average number of people living on a state
farm was 4,000. Collective farms averaged 30,000 hectares in area, of which 5,000 was arable.
Since 1993, major changes have occurred in farm structure. All collective farms were
privatized and most state farms have been privatized. Those state farms remaining
occupied about 4% of total cropped area in 1997 and were retained specifically for research
and elite seed production. By 1997, the new types of farming entities (and share of cultivated
area) were:
(1) partnerships and joint stock companies (21%)
(2) cooperatives (48%)
(3) other private enterprises (9%)
(4) peasant (family) farms (17%)
(5) private land (0.5%)
(6) state farms (4%).
Thus cooperatives and joint stock company farms now occupy a large share of the total area
cropped. These came from privatizing the state and collective farms, so have similar farm
sizes to those prevailing in the Soviet area. Some state farms were allocated to smaller family
farms. The number of family farms increased from 16 thousand in 1993 to 62 thousand in
1997. These had an average area of 435 hectares, and that arable was 82 hectares.
The process of privatizing the state properties was complex and involved considerable
change to legislation during the 1990s. (Kim et al. 1998). Also land is still valued
administratively and not in an open market situation. Although title to land is issued,  banks
are not prepared at this stage to use this as collateral for loans to farmers. Consequently,
farmers have faced serious credit difficulties and a lack of funds for purchasing inputs and
undertaking farm operations.
2 This part draws heavily upon Chapter II of Kim et al. (1998), who in turn drew heavily upon Asian
Development Bank (1996)10
Farmers have responded to the lack of credit in several ways. First, they use barter
extensively. They exchange farm output for farm inputs and other necessities. This can be
done with a forward pricing exchange, so that farmers may agree with local input suppliers
to exchange grain after harvest for inputs (e.g. fuel) used before planting. In this situation
farmers lose bargaining power and may pay high implicit interest rates in the exchange.
Second they save on inputs. Amongst other input reductions discussed above, cutbacks
have occurred in the number of persons working on farms. The unemployment rate in rural
areas increased from 5.9% in 1994 to 11% in 1996 (Kim et al. 1998) and may have worsened
since because of further cost savings by farmers. Another important factor has affected
farming in Kazakhstan. Under the state and collective farms, there was considerable
specialization of task by individuals. As the number of people working on farms has
declined, the farm workers have had to do tasks with which they are unfamiliar. This may
be an important change as far as on-farm operational efficiency goes and may take some
time before people have learnt a new approach to operating farms.3
Economic Interpretation of Agricultural Changes
A simple economic model can assist in explaining the move from the more-intensive
farming during the Soviet era to the less-intensive farming of Kazakhstan today. This is
depicted in Figure 13. A general production function for agriculture is shown in which
output (Y) is related to two factors: (1) the level of farm inputs other than land (X) and (2)
the accumulated net investment in agriculture over time (I).
In the Soviet era, state and collective farms were allocated and obtained inputs at minimal
artificial prices. Farms were paid a small procurement price for output, however. This was
150 Rubles/t for wheat during the 1980s, which depending on the exchange rate ranged
from US$30-70/t. In 1991, the procurement price in Kazakhstan was US$10/t (Kim et al.
1998, Table 3-4). In these circumstances, state farms pursuing their own interests would be
operated at a level of inputs which maximized yields, depicted by A in Figure 13. For
bureaucratic reasons farms may have been allocated inputs taking them beyond A,
especially in dry seasons.
Figure 13. Changes in Kazakhstan agriculture since
the Soviet Era.
Input (X)
3 This point was made in discussion with Hans Braun,
CIMMYT wheat scientist for Central Asia and
Caucasia.
In the 1990s, two key events have occurred.
First, farmers pay market prices for
purchased inputs and receive market prices
for output. The incentive through the 1990s
has been to reduce inputs strongly as a
consequence. This would have taken use of
inputs to B but for the second key event.
This is the virtual ceasing of investment in
agriculture, which has shifted the








A = yield maximizing level of Soviet era
B = profit maximizing level with markets
and risk
C = current situation with low investment11
factor shifting the production function downwards is the long-term degradation of the farm
land. Kazakhstan’s farmers are depicted to be operating at C in the late 1990s.
It is very important to separate the move to a much less-intensive form of production, A to
B, from that involving a lower level of productivity, B to C.4  Given that farmers now face
market prices and considerable price and production risk, their cutback in use of inputs,
relative to that of the Soviet era, is to be expected and is probably a lasting shift. It is almost
inconceivable under a market system that farmers would purchase inputs and apply them
at levels of the Soviet era. Farmers face much higher prices of inputs now than the implicit
or artificial prices they faced during the Soviet era.
The loss of productivity from low investment in Kazakhstan agriculture during the 1990s
and from land degradation need not necessarily be lasting. Whether the productivity lost
can be recovered will depend on policies and prices of wheat, as well as agricultural
research and development, land management practices, and related farming circumstances.
Several implications flow if the above analysis reflects the situation of Kazakhstan’s
agriculture today. Firstly the lower intensity of agriculture is probably driven largely by the
move to a market-based economy. Kazakhstan’s farmers face considerable price and
production risk and do not have strong credit and financial support for dealing with the
risks they face. This is likely to continue as a feature of agriculture well into the future,
although policy changes to improve the price and financial situation may encourage higher
input use. Secondly, there has probably been a significant loss of productivity because of
low investment in agriculture during the transition. This is transient and may be recouped
with appropriate policy, research and development and marketing changes. Thirdly, the
recommendations and technical performance of agriculture that were relevant during the
1980s are no longer relevant. Scientists should develop technologies relevant to a less-
intensive form of cropping and agriculture. Fourthly, the reduction in the livestock sector
implies lower domestic demand for feed grain which has implications for Kazakhstan’s
wheat export potential.
Inter-Sectoral Competition in the Kazakhstan Economy
In addition to the above changes, agriculture has been facing strong inter-sectoral
competition from growth of the energy sector in Kazakhstan.  Major reserves of oil and gas
have been discovered in the Caspian Basin. There are proven reserves of 15.5 billion barrels
of oil and this estimate could readily double within the next decade (International Herald
Tribune 1998). Oil production was 26 million tons in 1997 and is forecast to grow to 80
million tons a year by 2005. In addition to rapidly growing oil output, other energy and
minerals production is anticipated to grow strongly (International Herald Tribune 1998,
Financial Times 1998, The Economist 1998). Associated with this production growth has
been a major increase in direct foreign investment in oil and gas, exploration, drilling and
transportation.
4 Partial productivity of the variable inputs would be higher at B than A, because of diminishing returns.12
Developments within other sectors can have an important impact on agriculture’s
competitiveness. Although data are not available, virtually none of the direct foreign
investment in recent years would be for agriculture. Whatever there has been would be
very small in comparison with the investments in oil and gas and minerals processing.
There are strong indications that Kazakhstan’s agriculture has lost competitiveness in recent
years because of the growth of the energy and mining sectors. The loss of competitiveness
of the agricultural sector can arise when growth of the energy sector leads to an increase in
the real exchange rate (the inflation-adjusted exchange rate). In other words, the value of
the local currency, the Tenge, is higher than it would have been without the growth of the
energy sector. Thus export prices of grain, when converted to local currency, are weaker
than would be the case without the growth in the energy sector.
The real effective exchange rate is the best indicator of any change in competitiveness
caused by this inter-sectoral competition between agriculture, other exports and the energy
sector. Unfortunately, the IMF does not report the real effective exchange rate for
Kazakhstan. However, the rate was calculated and reported in Kazakhstan Economic
Trends (1998, Table 6.1). From 1995 to 4th Quarter 1997, there was a 17% real appreciation of
the Tenge against the 15 major trading partner currencies of Kazakhstan (op cit.).
Further evidence of the real appreciation of the Tenge can be obtained by comparing the
real bilateral exchange rate with the US Dollar’s movements in real terms. In Table 6 the real
bilateral rate of the Tenge against the US Dollar is reported, along with the real effective
exchange rate of the US Dollar. Two points should be noted. First, the real bilateral rate
against the US Dollar has appreciated strongly since 1995. This implies that the Tenge has
been devaluing at a rate less than the difference in the rate of inflation between the
Kazakhstan and US economies. Second, this has occurred at a time when the US real
effective exchange rate has appreciated and at a time when the US Dollar rate has been very
strong in international currency markets. The conclusion is that the movement in the real
value of the Tenge in recent years has made exports less competitive in recent years.
Table 6. Real exchange rate Indices of the tenge
compared with the real effective exchange rate of the US
dollar, 1995-1998
Real Effective Real Bilateral Real Effective
Exchange Rate Exchange Rate Exchange Rate
Kazakhstan1 US$/Tenge2 USA3
Year 1995=100 1995=100 1995=100
1995 100.0 100.0 100.0
1996 107.0 118.0 105.4
1997 112.8 131.2 115.3
1998         … 142.4 121.9
Source:
1 Kazakhstan Economic Trends (1998, Table 6.1).
2 Calculated by Spreadsheet from IMF data using the formula:
RBER =  eTenge/US$ . (CPIUS / CPIKaz ); where eTenge/US$ is the nominal
exchange rate and CPI is the Consumer Price Index. The result was
inverted and calculated to a base value of 1995 =100.
3 IMF, International Financial Statistics.
What has caused the Tenge to
appreciate in real terms?
Kazakhstan’s economic managers
adopted a stabilization program in
January 1994 including a flexible
exchange rate regime. However, there
appears to be some intervention
supporting the Tenge. In addition,
influences strengthening the real
exchange rate in recent years have
been the general economic settings for
the economy and the growth of the
energy sector.13
The Wheat Sector of Kazakhstan
Wheat Agro-Environments
Two broad agro-environments can be identified for wheat production in Kazakhstan, (1) the
northern spring wheat environment and (2) the southern winter wheat environment. The
climatic patterns typical of these environments were shown in Figures 2 and 3. The broader
environments for spring wheat and winter wheat are shown in Figures 14 and 15, adapted
from USDA (1994).
 In the northern region (generally between 48-55 degrees latitude N) spring wheat is grown
on steppe lands under dryland conditions. Precipitation generally averages less than 300
mm per annum and mean winter temperatures are near -20 degrees C. Precipitation falls as
snow through the late fall-early spring period and winds over the open plains can readily
cause snow to drift from open fields. The soils of the northern growing areas range from
grey forest soils to podzolic chernozem to grey to black chernozem to chestnut to brown
semi-desert soils (Committee for World Atlas of Agriculture 1969). These soils in virgin state
were never as high in clay content and organic matter as the heavy black earth chernozem
Figure 14. Former Soviet Union: Winter wheat.
Source: USDA (1994).
Figure 15. Former Soviet Union: Spring wheat.
Source: USDA (1994).
















soils of Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore,
cropping during the past 40 years has
lowered the organic content of the soils
by 5-30% (Gossen 1998). However,
their potential fertility is high
(Shegebaev 1997).
In the southern region
(generally between 42-48
degrees latitude N) winter
wheat is grown under irrigated
and rainfed conditions. Irrigation
water is from rivers fed by
mountain snows and where dryland
winter wheat is grown it is generally with
higher precipitation than in the north.
Because winter temperatures are less
extreme in the south, winter wheat is
grown. The soils are lighter in the
south, ranging from loessic to brown
semi-desert soils to light silty
loams and other alluvial soils
(Committee for the World Atlas
of Agriculture 1969).14
Because of the comparatively dry conditions and inherent soil fertility, the spring wheat
areas grow wheat of high protein content. The protein content usually ranges from 15-18%,
the grain has high gluten strength and is superior in quality to wheat produced in other
regions of Asia and Europe (Shegebaev 1997). Thus the spring wheat of Kazakhstan has the
potential to compete closely with Dark Northern Spring wheat of North America and
premium wheat of Australia.
Scientists of Kazakhstan have identified a large number of micro-environments (about 60)
within the broad agro-environments introduced above. They reported that they aimed to
release particular varieties of wheat for each micro-environment  under the Soviet system.
Data on the area planted to different varieties were not available. However, the number of
widely adopted varieties in farmers fields is likely to be well less than sixty.5  Kazakhstan
served as a major breeding location for other wheat production environments of the Soviet
system so considerable interchange of germplasm occurred with Russia and other Soviet
republics.
When the privatization of land occurred earlier this decade Kazakhstan’s government set
aside large areas for publicly-owned farms for research and seed production. This places the
country in a good position to multiply the seed of recommended varieties. However, these
seed farms have not sold as much seed as hoped, because of lack of demand and shortages
of funds and resources for the farms. A program of varietal development would need to
ensure that these farms are geared up for future seed production. Farmers retain large
amounts of seed from their wheat crops and have not been treating that seed. Elite farms
also assist with seed multiplication.
Figure 16. Allocation of agricultural and pastoral


















5 Data on adoption of particular wheat varieties were not obtained as part of this study. Scope exists for a low-cost
survey of wheat varietal use in Kazakhstan. If varietal adoption follows the patterns of other countries, the main
varieties in farmers’ fields probably number less than twenty (CIMMYT 1993).
Other Crops and Livestock
While wheat is the principal crop of
Kazakhstan, other crops and livestock
remain important in the farming systems.
The allocation of land to different uses is
presented in Figure 16. Despite the large
area of land plowed under the Soviet
agricultural development program, most of
Kazakhstan remains permanent pasture.
This ranges from dry desert rangelands to
steppe grasslands. In addition a sizable area
remains under woodlands and forest. Of the
total arable area of 32 million hectares, some
55-60% is cropped. The balance is fallow or
temporary pasture.15
Table 8. Total livestock numbers, Kazakhstan 1992-98
thousand head
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Cattle 9084 9576 9347 8073 6860 5425 4307
Buffalo 120 110 105 105 100 100 100
Horses 1666 1704 1777 1636 1557 1310 1083
Asses 45 45 40 40 40 40 40
Camels 145 149 155 141 130 111 97
Sheep 33908 33732 33312 24273 18786 13000 9969
Goats 692 688 897 859 799 679 415
Pigs 2794 2591 2445 1983 1623 1036 879
Rabbits 117000 115100 116300 89900 74900 58800 56000
Chicken 58000 51000 48000 32410 20650 15300 15890
Turkeys 459 433 388 266 156 117 102
Total Animal
 Units
(million) 151 154 152 126 106 83 67
Source: FAOStat. Animal units were calculated as follows: Cattle =  8
AUs, Buffalo = 10, Horse = 10, Ass = 5, Camel = 15, Sheep = 1,
Goat = 1,  Pig = 2, Rabbit = 0.1, Chicken = 0.1, Turkey = 0.6.
Table 7. Land use by crop, Kazakhstan 1992-97
million hectares
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Wheat 13887 12750 12620 12552 12280 11512 9534
Barley 5718 6972 6053 4826 3640 3182 2900
Rice 121 112 102 95 89 85 80
Maize 126 117 138 86 86 69 60
Other
Cereals 2624 2160 1680 1186 1015 772 715
Sub-Total 22466 22111 20593 18745 17110 15619 13289
Oil Crops 538 413 447 518 468 341 341
Potatoes 247 244 218 206 189 176 180
Cotton 112 110 111 110 106 104 103
Sugar Beet 85 69 56 41 32 11 12
Vege-
tables 108 89 104 108 105 129 129
Fruit 66 51 70 75 131 117 117
Total 25624 25080 23593 21798 20137 18495 16169
Wheat’s
Share (%)  54  51  61  58  61  62  59
Source: FAOStat
The area devoted to different crops is presented in Table 7. The next most important crops
for Kazakhstan are barley, oilseed crops, potatoes and cotton. Livestock numbers are
presented in Table 8. As well as a major decline in crop area since independence, there has
been a major decline in livestock numbers.
Wheat Production Developments
Comparisons between levels of wheat production in recent years in different European and
Asian regions and countries are presented in Figures 17 and 18. Both Central Asia’s wheat
production and that of Kazakhstan are dwarfed by China, the European Union and South
Asia. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s wheat sector is important to Central Asia. Kazakhstan is
the dominant wheat producer of Central
Asia and ranks third behind Russia and
Ukraine in wheat production amongst
CIS countries.  Kazakhstan is the most
important high protein wheat producer
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Figure 17. Wheat production in Asia and Europe,
average 1996–98.
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Figure 18. Wheat production in selected
countries near Kazakhstan, average 1996–98.





















The area, yield and production of wheat and all cereals in Kazakhstan is presented in Table
9.6   The area, yield and production of spring wheat and winter wheat in Kazakhstan is
presented in Table 10. The area of wheat from 1960 to 1998 is shown in Figure 19. The area
peaked in 1965, and was steadily declining during the Soviet era. Gossen (1997) highlights
some of the biological considerations in the decline, especially the drawing down of soil
organic matter in the steppe soils. Since 1990, the wheat area declined by more than 4
million hectares, a reduction of just over 30%.
Table 9.  Area, yield and production of wheat and all
cereals, Kazakhstan, 1960-1998
Wheat All Cereals
Year Area Yield Production Area Yield Production
mha t/ha mt mha t/ha mt
1960 18.05 0.85 15.34 22.01 0.85 18.71
1965 18.84 0.31 5.84 24.52 0.31 7.6
1970 17.52 0.98 7.17 22.69 0.98 22.24
1975 17.91 0.47 8.42 25.55 0.47 12.01
1980 17.09 1.09 18.61 25.34 1.09 27.51
1985 16.16 0.94 15.11 25.13 0.96 24.16
1986 15.60 1.07 16.74 24.56 1.15 28.31
1987 15.31 1.05 16.11 24.53 1.12 27.44
1988 14.88 0.82 12.16 24.29 0.93 22.56
1989 14.39 0.85 10.78 23.81 0.85 20.24
1990 14.07 1.34 16.20 23.34 1.34 31.28
1991 13.45 0.51 6.89 … … …
1992 13.88 1.32 18.28 22.60 1.32 29.77
1993 12.75 0.91 11.59 22.25 0.97 21.63
1994 12.62 0.72 9.05 20.71 0.79 16.45
1995 12.55 0.52 6.49 18.88 0.50 9.51
1996 12.28 0.63 7.68 17.19 0.65 11.24
1997 11.51 0.78 8.96 15.85 0.78 12.38
1998 9.53 0.52  5.00 13.29 0.50 6.68
Source: Kazakhstan State Committee for Statistics, FAOStat.
Table 10. Area, yield and production of spring wheat
and winter wheat,  Kazakhstan, 1960-1998.
Spring wheat Winter wheat
Year Area Yield Production Area Yield Production
mha t/ha mt mha t/ha mt
1960 … 0.84   …   … 1.00   …
1965 … 0.31   …   … 0.42  …
1970 ... 0.96  …      … 1.39  …
1975 … 0.47  …   … 0.61   …
1980 15.85 1.08 17.12  1.25 1.15 1.44
1985 15.17 0.93 14.11  0.99 1.02   1.01
1986 14.54 1.06 15.41  1.06 1.25 1.33
1987 14.16 0.98 13.88  1.15 1.95 2.24
1988 13.96 0.77 10.75  0.92 1.48  1.36
1989 13.29 0.70  9.30  1.10 1.32  1.45
1990 12.87 1.11 14.29  1.20 1.64  1.97
1991 12.25 0.46 5.59 1.20 1.08 1.30
1992 12.66 1.31 16.54  1.19 1.46  1.74
1993 11.44 0.84 9.65  1.13 1.71  1.93
1994 11.62 0.70 8.17 1.00 0.88  0.88
1995 11.75 0.50 5.87  0.80 0.78 0.62
1996 11.62 0.62 7.16  0.66 0.77  0.51
1997 10.87 0.75 8.20  0.64 1.41 0.90
1998 8.90 0.51  4.50  0.60 0.83 0.50
Source:   Kazakhstan State Committee for Statistics, FAOStat.
6 The longer term historical perspective on crop production in Kazakhstan is well reviewed in Gossen (1997) and
agriculture in the Soviet era is detailed in Committee for World Atlas of Agriculture (1969).
7 Data from FAO for 1998 imply the area is 1.9 million ha, but latest information with CIMMYT’s wheat specialists
direct from Central Asian countries is that the area was 2.8 million in 1998.
While the area of wheat in Kazakhstan
declined rapidly since independence, that of
Central Asian countries has grown
substantially during the 1990s. From 1992 to
1998, the wheat area of Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
combined grew from 1.25 million hectares to
2.8 million hectares.7
The spring wheat area has been the main
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Figure 19. Total wheat area, Kazakhstan, 1960–1998.
Source:Government of Kazakhstan and FAOStat. Note that the data
were available only at 5-year intervals from 1960 to 1985.17
of Kazakhstan. The spring wheat area has approximately halved since its peak of the mid
1960s and declined by about 4 million hectares between 1990 and 1998. The much smaller
winter wheat area was relatively stable around 1-1.2 million hectares during the Soviet era,
but has since fallen to around 600 thousand hectares.
The average yield of wheat in Kazakhstan from 1960 to 1998 is presented in Figure 20.  The
upwards trend in yield during the Soviet era was slightly more than 2% per annum, with
considerable variation about the trend. At 1990, the trend yield was about 1.1 t/ha.
However, since independence, average yields have declined considerably. Because of major
droughts in 1991, 1995 and 1998 and record yields in 1990 and 1992, identifying a trend
through the 1990s is difficult. However, it appears from visual appraisal of the data,
regression analysis of yields against time during the 1990s and Gossen (1997) that the
expected yield in 1998 was 650-700 kg/ha.
The average yields of spring wheat and winter wheat are presented in Figure 21.  The yields
are fairly closely correlated (r =.7) indicating that the weather and economic influences in
the spring wheat areas tend to have a similar impact on winter wheat yields. Winter wheat
yields are higher than those of spring wheat by about 50%, on average.
Comparisons of Kazakhstan’s average wheat yield with those of other Central Asian
countries and with Russia are presented in Figures 22 and 23. Note that wheat yields for
other Central Asian countries have risen since 1992, an interesting contrast with yields in
Kazakhstan. The other Central Asian countries grow winter wheat and in irrigated and in
higher-rainfall locations than Kazakhstan.
Why Kazakhstan’s winter wheat yields have not risen in line with other Central Asian
countries is an interesting question. The evidence suggests that policies, technologies, and
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Figure 20. Average wheat area, Kazakhstan,
1960–1998.
Source: Government of Kazakhstan and FAOStat. Note that the data
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Figure 21. Average yield, spring wheat and winter
wheat, Kazakhstan, 1960–1998.
Source: Government of Kazakhstan and FAOStat. Note that the data
were available only at 5-year intervals from 1960 to 1985.
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Contrast that with the close correlation in movement in average yields between wheat in
Kazakhstan and in Russia. Factors at play affecting wheat yields in Kazakhstan appear to be
similar to those in Russia.
The combined effects of declines in area and in yield of wheat have led to a major drop in
wheat output. The drought-affected crop of 1998 was estimated to be 5.5 million tons (FAO
1998, IGC 1998). However, removing the drought impact, production would have been
approximately 7-8 million tons in 1998.8  This can be contrasted with average levels of
production for the 1970s and 1980s of around 15 million tons.
Wheat Production Technology
Wheat production technology has changed dramatically in Kazakhstan in the past ten
years. Low profitability and higher risks for farmers have altered the wheat cropping
system in various ways. For both spring wheat and winter wheat, farmers have minimized
the inputs as follows:
1. One plowing only
2. One harrowing only (sometimes omitted)
3. Plant without fertilizer, and with lighter planting rate, 120kg/ha in spring wheat area
4. No sprays
5. Minimal maintenance on machinery
6. No treatment of seed
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Figure 22. Average wheat yield, Kazakhstan and other
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8 Based on a trend yield of 700 kg/ha and 10-11 million ha as compared to the actual yield of 520 kg/ha on 9.2
million ha.19
Typical crop rotations for spring wheat and winter wheat are presented in Table 11. While
there is considerable variation around these typical patterns, the farmers have moved
towards less intensive rotations which involve less intensive stocking of the land used for
grazing also. Stocking rates are not high in Kazakhstan presently. The total grazing
livestock numbers amount to just under 60 million animal units (an animal unit is
equivalent to one sheep in terms of feed requirements). With these on some 15 million
hectares of arable land which is fallow/grazing and some 80-100 million hectares of steppe
pastures ranging into desertic pastures and shrubs, the average stocking rate is about one
sheep per two hectares.
Costs of producing spring wheat at two levels of intensity of technology are presented in
Table 12. These are compiled using input prices that prevailed in 1998. Estimated trend
yields are employed also. Machinery costs were calculated using procedures similar to
those employed in Byerlee and Longmire (1985). The opportunity cost of land in this
calculation was taken to be the return from the land in its alternative pastoral use, sheep
Table 11. Typical crop rotations for spring wheat and
winter wheat, Kazakhstan
Spring Wheat Spring Wheat Winter
Year Intensive Extensive  Wheat
1 Wheat Wheat Wheat
2 Fallow/Grazing Fallow/Grazing Sugar beet/maize
3 Wheat Fallow/Grazing Barley
4 Fallow/Grazing Wheat Wheat/Grasses
5 Wheat Fallow/Grazing Grasses/Potato
6 Barley Fallow/Grazing Grasses/Fallow
7 Wheat Wheat Wheat
Table 12. Cost per hectare of operations under intensive and low-input cropping technology, spring wheat,
north Kazakhstan, 1998
Intensive Technology Low-Input Technology
Operation Number or Cost per Cost per Number or Cost per Cost per
Amount Hectare Tenge Hectare US$ Amount Hectare Tenge Hectare US$
Ploughing  1  931  11.63  1  931  11.63
Snow Furrowing  1  388  4.85  0  0  0
Harrowing 2 776 9.69 1 388 4.85
Seed (kg) 150 1440 18.00 120 1152 14.40
Planting 1 388 4.85 1 388 4.85
Fertilizer (kg nutrients)  50  1600  20.00  0  0  0
Spraying 2 776 9.69 0 0 0
Agrochemicals 1200 15.00 0 0 0
Harvesting 1354 16.92 1354 16.92
Drying and Storage (t)  1.1  440  5.50  0.7  280  3.50
Financing Inputs
@ interest rate  20%  750  9.37  20%  286  3.57
Land Cost 669 8.36 669 8.36
Miscellaneous @ 5% 443 5.53  211  2,63
Total  11152  139.40  5658  70.72
Source:  Spreadsheet file.
production. The stocking rate for sheep was
taken to be one sheep per two hectares. The
net return to sheep per hectare was
calculated to be US$8.40.
In the switch to less-intensive wheat
production during the 1990s, farmers have
almost halved the production costs per
hectare. In fact, many farmers might have
saved even more than this by using old
equipment and thus having lower20
depreciation and finance costs for machinery than in the tables. How costs per ton
produced alter under different scenarios is analyzed later in this report.
Wheat Marketing and Transport
The marketing system for wheat in Kazakhstan relied heavily on procurement by
government until the mid-1990s. However, this method of selling has declined considerably
as indicated in Figure 24. By withdrawing from purchasing most of the wheat produced, the
government was seeking to encourage the development of a private marketing system for
the grain. One form of selling of grain that has grown rapidly is barter. Generally, farmers
do this with local input suppliers. The latter then sell the grain on to the private trade. The
private trade has grown as state involvement has declined. However, because of low wheat
prices in 1998, the government announced that it would purchase up to 1 million tons in
1998 marketing season at US$80/t for the current season.
There are more than ten grain trading companies in Kazakhstan, and they own elevators
and grain processing facilities (Kim et al. 1998). Kazakhstan has about 11 million tons of
elevator storage capacity, with both horizontal and vertical storage facilities. The country
has considerable infrastructure for grain transport. Railways and roads were an investment
priority during the Soviet era and these remain in reasonable working condition.
Infrastructure generally has been receiving little investment in recent years, although the
Government announced in 1998 that a new terminal would be built at Aktau, on the
Caspian Sea, to encourage growth in exports of wheat to Iran.
The grain marketing system is still evolving and farmers in 1998 raised considerable
concerns about domestic wheat marketing. One concern is that the marketing of grain has
become concentrated amongst a small number of private grain trading firms. Another
concern was the size of transaction costs involved in marketing of grain, including taxes.
Considerable scope exists for analysis of grain marketing and for training about grain
marketing in Kazakhstan. The marketing institutions are weak and considerable
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Figure 24. Changing use of wheat marketing channels







Price Determination in the Kazakhstan
Wheat Market
Kazakhstan is usually a net exporter of
wheat. The commodity balances for wheat
for selected years are presented in Table 11.
Note that these data are from US
Department of Agriculture sources and may
differ from figures available from the FAO
or other sources. Also the last four years of
the tables have estimates which are not
verified with latest stocks data. They are
indicative of the situation for Kazakhstan’s
wheat market generally.21
Because Kazakhstan is a net exporter of wheat, export prices are the main force determining
the prices paid for wheat on farm. Marketing margins and transport costs drive a wedge
between the export price obtained (on rail or truck at the border) and the farm price paid.
The exchange rate also influences the difference between export prices and on-farm prices.
U.S. dollars are used as the basis for pricing export grain and Kazakhstans' farmers think in
terms of U.S. dollars as readily as local currency.
Wheat Prices
The prices received for wheat sold by farmers through all marketing channels is reported in
Figure 25. These are a weighted-average of prices obtained through the four main
marketing channels, including barter. Real prices in local currency are also shown. There
was a sizable decline in real prices from 1996 to 1998. This is also reflected in Figure 26,
which shows the Kazakhstan prices received converted to US dollars.
Table 13. Commodity balance sheets for wheat in Kazakhstan, 1987/88 to 1998/99
Marketing Opening Total Domestic of Which of Which of Which Closing
Year Stocks Production  Imports Supply  Exports Use: Food Feed Seed  Stocks
thousand tons
87/88 1,500 16,108 100 17,708 6,850 9,139 1,900 3,500 2,300 1,719
88/89 1,719 12,162 300 14,181 4,500 8,291 1,800 3,300 2,200 1,390
89/90 1,390 10,783 250 12,423 2,900 8,087 1,800 3,300 2,200 1,436
90/91 1,436 16,197 100 17,733 5,000 9,408 1,900 3,800 2,100 3,325
91/92 3,325 6,889 300 10,514 1,400 7,364 1,800 3,000 2,100 1,750
92/93 1,750 18,285 125 20,160 5,800 9,569 2,050 3,500 2,050 4,791
93/94 4,791 11,585 0 16,376 5,500 7,001 2,000 2,000 2,000 3,875
94/95 3,875 9,100 0 12,975 4,500 5,971 1,900 1,500 1,900 2,504
95/96 2,504 6,490 3 8,997 2,663 5,399 1,800 1,200 1,890 935
96/97 935 7,680 11 8,627 2,140 5,330 1,800 1,100 1,849 1,156
97/98 1,156 8,960 10 10,126 3,073 5,154 1,800 1,000 1,696 1,900
98/99 1,900 5,000 10 6,910 1,500 4,408 1,800 900 1,288 1,002
Source:1987/88 to 1994/95 - U.S. Department of Agriculture, Website http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/international/95008/A/
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Figure 25. Average wheat price received by farmers,
all marketing channels, Kazakhstan, 1994–1998.
Source: Government of Kazakhstan, State Statistical Office.
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Figure 26. Average wheat price received by farmers,
all marketing channels, Kazakhstan, 1994–1998, U.S.
dollar terms.
Source: Government of Kazakhstan, State Statistical Office.
Note: The real US$ price of wheat in Kazakhstan has been
calculated using the US index of inflation.
Real US$ price Real tenge price
Actual tenge price Nominal US$ price22
The decline of wheat prices received in Kazakhstan from US$100/t to US$60/t from 1997 to
the drought year of 1998 concerned farmers considerably. The US export price of Hard Red
Winter (HRW) wheat declined from US$147/t in the July-September quarter of 1997 to
US$111/t in the same quarter 1998. Kazakhstan farm prices declined with world wheat
prices. However, production of wheat in Kazakhstan declined considerably in 1998, so that
Kazakhstan became approximately self-sufficient in wheat. In this case prices might be
expected to increase relative to the world price, if anything. Two factors might explain the
decline. Firstly, demand may have contracted sharply because of general financial
uncertainty, the collapse of Asian and Russia’s economies and declining livestock numbers.
Secondly, grain traders may have been widening margins to boost profits and to cover
additional risks.
Analysis of how the price paid to Kazakhstan farmers in 1998 compares with international
prices was then undertaken. The first analysis involved pricing wheat on farm in northern
Kazakhstan (at Shortandy, north of Astana) using the US export price of HRW wheat. The
ocean freight rate employed was for grain from the US Gulf to St. Petersburg. Rail freight
rates were obtained from Kazakhstan Rail’s freight division. Moscow was used as the
deficit consumption location and thus the point where prices peak. The results are shown in
Table 14. For an export price at the US Gulf of US$116/t the on-farm parity price at
Shortandy is US$93/t. This is considerably above the price of around US$60/t that farmers
were receiving.
A second analysis was undertaken to compare prices received by farmers with bread prices
in Kyrgyzstan, one of the export destinations for Kazakhstan wheat. The analysis is
reported in Table 15. In this case, standard allowances were used for value adding at
Table 14. Pricing high quality wheat on farm at
Shortandy, Akmola Oblast, in competition with
imported HRW wheat from the USA in the Moscow
market,  September 1998
Item US$/t Tenge/t
Export price, U.S. Gulf,
Hard Red Winter Wheat 116 9280
Freight cost, U.S. Gulf to St. Petersburg 22 1760
Import price, St. Petersburg, c.i.f. 138 11040
Transport cost, St. Petersburg to Moscow 15 1200
Landed price, Moscow 153 12240
Transport cost, Tabyl to Moscow 28 2240
Border price, Tabyl 125 10000
Transport cost, Shortandy to Tabyl 6 496
On rail price, Shortandy 119 9504
Loading at rail 3 240
Transport cost, farm to Shortandy rail 3 224
Trade commission and fees (10%) 10 800
Less quality adjustment 10 800
On-farm parity price 93 7440
Source:  IGC (1998), Kazak Rail, Kim et al. (1998), spreadsheet
analysis.
Table 15. Pricing wheat on farm at Shortandy,
Akmola Oblast, using the bread price in the central
market, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, September 1998
Item US$/t Tenge/t
Retail price of bread, Bishkek, US$0.30/kg 300 24000
Less retailer’s margin, 30% 210 16800
Less baker’s margin, 20% 168 13440
Less wheat to flour conversion, 83% 139 11155
Plus bran etc. by-products of milling, 17% 154 12345
Less local miller’s margin, 15% 131 10493
Less local agent’s margin, 10% 118 9444
Local transport Bishkek, rail to mill 3 200
Local price of wheat on rail, Bishkek 116 9244
Less rail freight, Shortandy to Bishkek 18 1440
On rail price, Shortandy 98 7804
Loading at rail 3 240
Transport cost, farm to Shortandy rail 3 224
Trade commission and fees (10%) 9 720
On-farm parity price 83 6670
Source: Kyrgyz Agricultural Market Information System, p.3, The
Central Asian Post, 28 September 1998. Marketing
margins are set conservatively and actual costs may be
less than the margins employed.23
different levels of the market.  In this analysis the on-farm parity price is US$83/t, again
well above prices received by farmers in 1998 despite using marketing costs in the analysis
which were probably more than actual.
What price of wheat might Kazakhstan expect to receive for wheat in the future?  To
consider this, long-term trends in world export wheat prices were constructed. The prices in
real terms (base 1998) and the trends for those prices over the past twenty years are
presented in Figure 27. Three types of wheat were included, US HRW No 2, US Dark
Northern Spring No 2 14% protein, and Australian Prime Hard 14% protein. At October
1998, the real price of US HRW was about US$150/t. While the prices and trends of DNS
and APH wheat were above those of HRW, the latter was used as the basis for estimating
prices to be received in the future by Kazakhstan’s farmers.
IFPRI estimated the likely long-term movement in real wheat prices under different
conditions (Rosegrant, Agcaoili-Sombilla and Perez 1995). They projected a decline in real
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Figure 27. Long-term movements in real export prices
of wheat, USA and Australia, 1977/78–1997–98.
Source: International Grains Council.
Note:Real prices are calculated using the US CPI as the deflator.
US export prices are fob US Gulf, Australia's is fob East Coast
Australian Prime
Hard (14% protein)
US HRW No 2 (Ord)
US DNS No 2 (14% protein)
prices in the baseline scenario from 1990 to
2020 from US$156/t to US$132. Employing
this rate of decline and applying it to a
base price of US$150/t in 1998, the real US
export price to be expected in 2005 is
US$144/t and in 2010 is US$140/t. While
considerable variation around this level is
highly probable, it provides a basis for
gauging the future competitiveness of
Kazakhstan’s wheat sector. These translate
into real US prices on farm in northern
Kazakhstan of US$104/t and US$100/t,
respectively, assuming the same
differential between Kazakhstan and US
prices as in 1998.
Competitiveness of Wheat Production
Background to Competitiveness
Competitiveness is defined as ‘the ability of businesses or industries to compete
internationally’ or ‘the ability of businesses or industries in one country to compete with
those of other countries’ (EPAC 1991). Thus competitiveness relates to firms or an industry
and not to the nation. Competitiveness should not be confused with absolute advantage,
comparative advantage and competitive advantage of nations, all of which  relate to
competitiveness but are not the same concept (Porter 1990, Krugman 1991, Warr 1994). Also
a measure of competitiveness should be a relative measure, since ability to compete is
always relative to competition (Hu 1995). In the case of wheat in Kazakhstan, the
competition derives from wheat exporters from other parts of the world. As well, the
competitiveness of Kazakhstan’s wheat sector will be affected by developments in other
sectors of the economy since farmers are facing inter-sectoral competition for resources.24
How has competitiveness been measured by economists?  One approach has been to
measure the change in prices of tradables (i.e. goods and services traded or with potential to
be traded) relative to prices of domestic goods and services. As prices of  tradables rise
relative to prices of domestic goods and services, the competitiveness of the tradables sector
will rise. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent measuring prices of tradables and non-
tradables for most economies. A related method of analyzing changes in competitiveness has
been widely used. This involves measuring movements in the real effective exchange rate.9
However, this gives the general picture for the tradables sector as a group and not for
specific enterprises or industries within it.
Another way of assessing competitiveness has been to measure a country’s share of world
exports in a particular commodity or other export item. If a country’s share of total wheat
exports is growing in relation to competitors, for example, this may reflect increasing
competitiveness of that country’s wheat sector. However, it may also reflect a policy which is
encouraging exports and boosting that country’s market share. In this case the gain in
market share is not because the industry has gained competitiveness, it is because of a policy
which is not increasing competitiveness at all. The measure of market share is a rather loose
measure of competitiveness as a consequence.
Each year, two different institutes based in Switzerland compile indices of competitiveness
for a wide range of countries.10  These are based on detailed surveys of people in business
and government with knowledge of the countries included. League tables are published
which rank countries according to their competitiveness index. While useful, care is needed
in interpreting these indices. The main caution is that ‘no nation can be competitive…in
everything’ (Porter 1990, p.7). For further elaboration on this point see Krugman (1991).
Despite considerable development in measuring policy effects, effective protection and
domestic resource costs, economists have made little progress in measuring competitiveness.
Few economists have attempted the exercise. In this paper a simple approach to measuring
competitiveness is employed at the farm level in Kazakhstan. Likely costs of wheat
production are compared with likely prices to be received by Kazakhstan’s wheat farmers.
The likely prices will be determined largely by international wheat prices and marketing
and transport cost differentials. Providing costs of production and marketing generally can
be maintained near or below the price of competing exports in markets of relevance to
Kazakhstan, her wheat growers will be competitive.
Another general caution on interpretation of the measure. Economics tells us that costs vary
at the margin according to intensity of inputs and other marginal conditions. We also know
that farms differ in their productivity and profitability due to many farm or firm-specific
differences. The analysis in this study is for the average or representative grower and does
not attempt to capture differences between farms. However, the analysis is conducted for
several levels of intensity of inputs and using alternative levels of productivity and price.
9 The real effective exchange rate is the index for a country of the trade-weighted currency exchange rates with
major trading partners, each adjusted for relative rates of inflation at home and in the partner country. The latter is
compiled by the IMF and reported in their International Financial Statistics for most countries.
10 The websites for the two institutes are http://www.imd.ch/wcy/brochure.html and http://www.weforum.org/
publication/gcr/  .25
Measuring Competitiveness
For this study, competitiveness is measured by comparing the likely prices that
Kazakhstan’s wheat farmers will receive for their product at the farm in the future against
their likely production costs per ton. This requires translating expected world prices of
wheat in the future into their on-farm parity price at a representative location in
Kazakhstan. The location is near Shortandy, north of Astana in Akmola Oblast, in the heart
of the spring wheat area of northern Kazakhstan. The parity pricing method was presented
in Table 11 above. Moscow is taken as the deficit consumption region and Kazakhstan’s
wheat is priced against competing product in that market.
Likely future prices of wheat for Kazakhstan were calculated using the trend in the US
export price of Hard Red Winter wheat after it was converted to real terms (using the US
CPI).  The trend price of  US HRW (No.2) at US Gulf was approximately US$150/t in 1998.
The annual average decline in the trend estimated over 1977/78 to 1997/98 was -2.9%, a
decline considerably higher than found for other analyses. Future declines in the real
export price were based on IFPRI’s long-term decline in real wheat prices reported for their
baseline projections (Rosegrant, Agcaolli-Sombilla and Perez 1995, Table 2). Applying those
rates of decline in future years, the real US export price was calculated to be US$144/t in
2005 and US$140/t in 2010.
These were translated into on-farm parity prices assuming that real costs per ton in the
transport and marketing chain between the US Gulf Port and Moscow and the farm in
Kazakhstan to Moscow do not change.11  The trend in real ocean freight rates from US Gulf
to St. Petersburg was estimated for the years 1977/78 to 1997/78. It declined at 3.1% per
year on average. However, domestic transport charges in Kazakhstan and Russia are likely
to decline by a similar rate in the future as marketing and transport efficiency improves.
Overall the net effect of assuming no change in real charges along the marketing chain is
likely to be small because of offsets in the freight differential between the U.S. Gulf to
Moscow and Shortandy to Moscow.
The on-farm parity prices calculated from the above analysis were US$104/t in 2005 and
US$100/t in 2010, respectively. There was thus a US$40/t net freight and marketing cost
differential between the US Gulf Price and that on farm in northern Kazakhstan. As an
alternative, the approximate US$60/t differential that applied in September 1998 was
employed. This leads to a second set of parity prices at US$84/t in 2005 and US$80/t in
2010. To keep the analysis of competitiveness simple, the 2010 prices were employed,
US$100/t and US$80/t. The latter of these provides a stricter test of competitiveness of the
wheat sector.
The costs of growing spring wheat in Kazakhstan at two levels of intensity were reported
earlier in Table 12. Costs vary with the price of wheat because of the changing opportunity
cost of wheat seed. At US$80/t for wheat on-farm the estimated cost of production of
spring wheat is US$77.70 per hectare. This is higher than other cost estimates for low-input
11 The quotations in the International Grain Council’s Grains Market Report and World Grain Situation are for freight of
heavy grain from US Gulf Port to Former Soviet Union Baltic Ports.26
growing of wheat in Kazakhstan. In Kim et al. (1998, Table 2-8) the cost of producing wheat
in 1996 was reported to be $62.80 per hectare.12  However, this lower estimate has no cost
for land and assumes that there is zero cost for machinery depreciation and finance.
To assess the competitiveness of wheat, various scenarios for wheat production were
envisaged and the costs per ton of wheat produced were compared with the parity prices
above. Initially, the prices of all other inputs and of the competing sheep enterprise were
taken to remain constant in real terms. A variation on this case is reported later.
Competitiveness of Wheat: Base Technology and During 1998 Drought and Soviet Era
In the competitiveness analysis, costs of production per hectare and per ton were calculated
for a base technology initially. A low input wheat technology typical of Kazakhstan wheat
growing of the late 1990s with a trend yield of 700 kg/ha was employed. The costs were
calculated in the base year using an opportunity cost of seed of US$150/t. Cost per ton of
wheat produced was calculated net of the value of stubble grazing. Thus
Cost per ton =  (Cost per hectare - value of stubble grazing per hectare) / yield.
Two comparisons were made with the base costs initially. First, the costs of wheat
production using the 1998 drought-affected yield of 500 kg/ha were calculated. Second, the
costs associated with a high-input technology typical of the Soviet era were calculated. For
this, yield was set at 1.4 t/ha and two plowings, one snow furrowing, two harrowings, two
sprays and 50 kg/ha of fertilizer were taken as the inputs. The costs of the Soviet-style
enterprise were made using 1998 input prices for direct comparison with the base costs. The
results are presented in Figure 28.
Costs per hectare of the Soviet-era technology are calculated to be almost double those of
the low-input technology for growing wheat of the late 1990s. However, Soviet-era costs per
ton are calculated to be about 25% above those of the low-input technology base of the late
1990s. Thus Kazakhstan’s spring wheat farmers have lowered costs per ton by about 20%
since the early 1990s.












End of Soviet era Base 1998 1998 drought
Figure 28. Cost per ton of wheat produced and cost
per hectare under alternative production methods.
Note: In the base case for 1998, yields are at trend of 700 kg/ha and
implicit seed costs at their trend of US$150.
per ton
per ha
Note how the drought increases cost per ton.
Farmers may make more changes to practices
in a drought to lower costs, although with
minimal-input technology the scope for
saving further is limited. All three costs per
ton reported in Figure 28 are above US$100,
the more optimistic parity price for farmers in
Kazakhstan over the next 5-10 years. Thus
wheat is uncompetitive at current yields with
low-input technology and would be
uncompetitive using a high-input technology
akin to that of the Soviet era.27
Crop Improvement and Competitiveness
The analysis in this section involved asking what happens to competitiveness of wheat
under different types of crop improvement. Two types of crop improvement were
considered. For the first, mean yield improvements of 300 kg/ha were taken to arise from
varietal improvement, treatment of seed and improved cropping practices which cost little
(e.g. better timing of operations). Justification for this potential improvement can be
gleaned from Morgounov et al. (1999). Thus the technology is presumed to remain low
input.
For the second, a change to a medium-input technology was considered. In addition to the
improvements above, 50 kg/ha of fertilizer nutrients and better weed control and snow
furrowing were presumed to add an additional 400 kg/ha to yields. This would take yields
to 1.4t/ha, near to long-term targets that some scientists and economists of Kazakhstan
consider appropriate for the wheat sector.
The analysis of competitiveness is summarized in Figure 29. For yield gains of
approximately 300 kg/ha with low-input technology, wheat in Kazakhstan is calculated to
be competitive at a parity price of US$80/t.  The gains are down to about 100 kg/ha if
prices for farmers average US$100/t. In contrast, wheat grown with medium-input
technology, including 50 kg nutrients/ha of fertilizer and one spraying for weeds, needs a
much larger yield gain to be competitive.
Improved Competitiveness from Marketing Efficiency Gains
Wheat farmers in Kazakhstan could gain competitiveness in ways other than crop
improvement. One obvious way is through marketing efficiency gains. Obviously, if these
could deliver higher prices to farmers, the competitiveness of wheat would improve. The
efficiency gains would simply lower the world price at which Kazakhstan’s farmers can be
competitive or make them more competitive at a given world price.
Earlier analysis of prices on farm and of world export prices suggests that a decline of
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Figure 29. Yield gains needed for spring wheat to be




the farmer perspective, every U.S. dollar
saved in marketing costs per ton that is
passed on, is equivalent to saving one U.S.
dollar in production costs per ton. A saving
in marketing costs of US$10/t would offer
the same to farmers as a yield improvement
of around 75 kg/ha at base yield.  This gain
in competitiveness could be additional to
any other obtained on farm.
A second benefit to farmers from improved
efficiency of marketing would come from
lower prices of purchased inputs. A decline
in purchased input prices of 5% is calculated28
to offer farmers a reduction in overall production costs per ton of  3.4% to 3.6% depending
on the input intensity of the technology. This would offer farmers the equivalent of a yield
improvement of  about 50 kg/ha. Thus marketing efficiency gains of the magnitude
considered feasible would offer farmers the equivalent of yield improvement of 125 kg/ha.
Broader Economic Changes
Competitiveness may be affected by broader economic factors in addition to the industry-
specific ones considered above. In this section the impact of a real interest rate cut of 10% is
calculated.13  Then the impact of a 10% devaluation is analyzed assuming that Kazakhstan
is a small open economy and that the exchange rate change flows through fully to prices of
wheat and purchased inputs.
A 10% reduction in real interest rates for farmers would only occur if the financial system
for agriculture became open, mature and secure. Farmers would need to be able to use title
to land as security for loans from banks and other financiers. Such a reduction would alter
their credit situation dramatically and would lower costs per ton by about US$12 from the
budget calculations made. This is the equivalent of a yield improvement of just over 100
kg/ha. Each percentage point reduction in interest rates thus lowers costs by US$1.20/t, or
is the equivalent of a 10 kg/ha yield gain.
A 10% devaluation would have two effects, prices of wheat would rise by 10% and prices of
purchased inputs by the same percentage.14  The costs of growing wheat for the base yield
of 700 kg/ha exceed returns from grain per hectare by about US$5/t. Also, purchased
inputs and machinery capital costs amount to about 50% of total costs. Seed also accounts
for just over 25% of total costs for the low-input technology. These inputs all rise in price
with a devaluation and virtually fully offset any benefit the farmers might expect from a
declining Tenge. Thus the devaluation has a very small effect on net returns to wheat and
on the underlying competitiveness of wheat production.
Sources of Future Productivity Growth
Overview of Recent Developments
Four main factors are likely to have affected the productivity of wheat in Kazakhstan in
recent years, (1) the declining productivity of the resource base from unsustainable
cropping over many years, (2) the virtual ceasing of investment by farmers in new
machinery, inputs and technologies, (3) the decline of the public research and extension
system, and (4) inefficiencies in the marketing of wheat and key farm inputs to farmers. In
addition to this agriculture is facing considerable adjustment pressure from growth in the
energy sector and from growth in the services sector with its strong urban orientation.
Farmers, along with business people and consumers, have faced sizable risk from high
13 The real rate of interest employed in the base technology was 20% per annum, so that for this
14 For simplification, we have assumed that Kazakhstan farmers are price takers in both the export market for wheat
and in the purchased input markets. If the farmers have some market power, the exchange rate effects will tend to
be overstated.29
inflation, lack of an effective financial system for agriculture and general economic
uncertainty. Farmers have also seen privatization occurring in the economy and generally
have lost out in this process. These factors also have probably affected farm productivity.
In considering strategies for future productivity growth in wheat the broad framework in
which farmers are likely to be operating is important. On the assumption that Kazakhstan
will continue on its path towards an open market-oriented economy, farmers will be facing
fully-commercial conditions. Farmers will be paying prices for inputs that are market
driven.15  Generally, farmers will be receiving prices for wheat that are related to export
parity.16   This implies a very different situation to what many farmers experienced during
the Soviet era.
The main implication of the above in Kazakhstan is that farmers are likely to be very
reluctant to spend money on inputs and new technologies in the short term (next 2-3 years).
They are likely to seek input-saving methods of crop production wherever possible. This
has already occurred during the 1990s but will likely continue. The 1998 drought and the
low prices received recently for wheat have drained farmers’ reserves. Consequently they
are likely to spend minimally on fertilizer, seed and fuel and are likely to invest little in their
farms, machinery and in new technologies. A series of well-above average seasons coupled
with high grain prices could lead to some renewal of spending. However, the chances of
this happening are low.
Over the medium term, say the next 5-10 years, some renewal of investment in agriculture
might be expected. The rapid decline during the 1990s in the capital stock and the more
favorable returns that potentially will come from investment in agriculture in the future are
likely to  encourage such investment. How much this occurs will depend on the general
economic conditions faced by farmers as well as the relative prices of grain to key inputs
and the productivity of wheat. At least one international tractor manufacturer is targeting
Kazakhstan as a market with long-term potential.
From analysis earlier (see p. 26) the high-input technology of wheat growing in Kazakhstan
employed during the Soviet era would be about 20% less competitive under market–
oriented conditions that now prevail. This has major implications for research, extension,
education and for farmers. A new approach towards the rainfed agriculture in Kazakhstan
is required in which the focus is on a new low-input method of farming. In the next few
years, farmers are likely to adopt only those methods that are very low cost.
Improving Productivity of Soils and Natural Resources
Considerable degradation of soils of the steppes of Kazakhstan occurred when large areas
were plowed and cropped during the Soviet era (Gossen 1998). Erosion increased due to
both wind and water and the soil organic matter levels declined due to fallowing and
limited retention of crop residues. While wheat yields were trending upwards during this
15 The fact that many farmers may be paying for their inputs by barter or in-kind payment makes no difference to
this point.
16 Although the on-farm price can probably be increased with more efficient marketing of wheat in Kazakhstan and
into export  markets.30
time, this was probably due mainly to increased use of artificial fertilizers, herbicides,
improved varieties and use of some soil conservation technologies. However, “mining” of
the soil still occurred in that the soil organic matter level was declining and soil nutrients
were being drawn down. The methods were taking grain production to a point of “break
down” (Gossen 1998, p. 45).
Detailed information is not available on how the recent changes in farming in Kazakhstan
have been affecting the status of the soils. However, it is likely that further degradation will
occur in the immediate future because of the lack of funds for investment in farming.
Generally, the move to a low-input type of farming could have two effects on the resource
base:  (1) reduced degradation because of less-frequent cropping and reduced grazing
pressure from livestock (2) increased degradation because of less investment in the land and
less care of it by farmers.
Scientists need to know more about the degradation and remedies for it in farmers’ fields in
a low-input environment. Is it cropping the land less frequently?  Is it reduced tillage and
crop residue retention?  What roles do other crops, livestock and agroforestry have to play?
Can wheat growing be concentrated in those lands better suited to its production?  Should
cropping cease in marginal areas?  In considering the remedies it is important not to rely on
crop yield as the single performance indicator, since this can always be boosted by drawing
on the natural resource or applying artificial fertilizer. A wider approach to the farming
system and to monitoring the natural resource status, especially that of soils, is needed.
Principles outlined in Altieri et al. (1987), Edwards et al. (1990) and Reeves (1998) need to be
followed to achieve more sustainable cropping and farming practices. Kazakhstan’s
scientists have been working on a number of soil conservation methods for many years.
This is especially the case for wheat in northern Kazakhstan, pioneered by A.I. Baraev. They
have drawn heavily on knowledge and techniques appropriate to their environments,
including from Russia, Canada, and the USA (Lumpkin and Harris 1997).
Techniques tested include the use of blade plows, stubble retention, windbreak crops and
snow plowing. More general agrolandscape management methods have been tested with
technical success (e.g. defining areas of a farm suitable for more intensive cropping and
defining areas that should be left in grass or planted to trees). The extent to which different
methods have been adopted and their use by farmers in the low-input environment
prevailing today is not documented. As part of future research on improving the natural
resource base adoption studies should be undertaken to assess impact and change in the
resource base. These should combine in-field measurement of the status of the natural
resources as well as economic assessment of techniques employed.
Further research, including long-term trials and trials on-farm, is warranted to encourage
farmers to use alternative soil conservation methods, alternative crop and pasture rotations,
stubble retention and other means of conserving and rebuilding soils.  This research is likely
to have long-term payoff but may not produce much immediate impact. Nevertheless it
should be considered as an integral part of a future research, extension and training
program for increasing the productivity of agriculture of Kazakhstan.31
Improving On-Farm Productivity of Wheat
There is considerable scope for improving the on-farm productivity of wheat in Kazakhstan.
The potential methods for improvement are well documented in Morgounov et al. (1998)
and can be categorized as:
¨ varietal improvement and related seed management
¨ agronomic and crop management improvements
¨ operational and logistical improvements on farm and in markets.
Varietal Improvement and Seed Management
The scope existing for wheat varietal improvement in Kazakhstan is documented in
Shegebaev (1998) and Movchan (1998). The characteristics given high priority in improving
spring wheat varieties are drought tolerance, higher yield potential, early maturity,
immunity to diseases and superior grain quality (Morgounov et al. 1998, Appendix 1). For
winter wheat the priorities are higher yield potential, increased disease resistance and high
quality (op cit.). Combined with varietal improvement are the gains that can be achieved
from better seed management, notably treatment on farms for seed-borne diseases. Farmers
in recent years have not been treating retained seed and seed-borne diseases have been
increasing in prevalence.
Long-term trials data at the A.I. Baraev Kazak Institute of Cereal Production, Shortandy,
Akmola Oblast, northern Kazakhstan, shown by chart at the station, indicate that on-station
wheat yields increased from about 1.5 t/ha in the mid 1950s to about 2.5 t/ha by 1990.
However, from 1993 to 1998 the on-station yield averaged 1.1 t/ha. While drought has
contributed to the reduced yields, more than weather has been at play. Wheat research has
been facing severe funding and resource constraints during the 1990s and this is reflected in
the decline of the average yield at the station.
Considerable reduction in resources devoted to wheat varietal improvement in Kazakhstan
has occurred during the 1990s. For example, the Kazak Agricultural Research Institute,
Almalybak, near Almaty, has experienced a reduction of scientific staff from 420 to 100 since
1990.  The number of agricultural scientists in Kazakhstan has halved during the 1990s to
about 5,000 in 1998. Furthermore, there were concerns among scientists visited during
September/October 1998 of further serious funding cuts and related losses of jobs. While
some adjustment downwards in resources devoted to wheat research in line with the
general decline of the agricultural sector might be expected, the reductions have been
especially severe. Consequently there is a serious morale problem in the research sector.
From the farmer perspective, wheat varietal improvements can be acquired at relatively low
cost. This means there is a high chance of such improvements being adopted under the low-
input farming likely to prevail in Kazakhstan. Spring wheat varietal improvements pursued
have to be suited to the low input and low precipitation environment of Kazakhstan’s
spring wheat area or they will not be adopted. The winter wheats generally are grown in
higher yielding environments and greater emphasis can be placed on yield potential in their
improvement.32
The purchase of improved wheat seed is the main cost involved in varietal improvement by
the farmer. Seed costs are a relatively high share of wheat production costs since planting
rates range from 120-150 kg/ha, even in the lower yielding spring wheat areas. Farmers do
not purchase commercial seed routinely. When they do, costs can be lowered by buying
smaller quantities of commercial seed and multiplying on-farm or by purchasing seed
multiplied by other farmers. Seed costs of improved varieties may also be reduced by
farmers planting fields for seed multiplication using lower planting rates. Varietal
improvement should take a high priority in pursuit of future gains in wheat productivity. It
is important though that the varietal improvement be relevant to the low-input conditions
that are likely to prevail.
Seed treatment for seed-borne diseases costs about $5-6/t of seed in Kazakhstan. With a
planting rate of between 120-150kg/ha, this amounts to a cost of $0.60-0.90/ha, about 1% of
total growing costs. Farmers have not been treating seed in recent years in order to save
costs. With seed treatment delivering 150-200 kg/ha yield gains (Nurmuratov 1998, p.59), at
least under trial conditions, the treatment appears to deliver a sufficiently high rate of
return to justify the expense, even at low prices of wheat on farm.17
The gains in yield and/or quality that can be obtained from varietal improvement is a
question that can be resolved by research. Such research should be applied and potential
new varieties taken to farmers’ fields for assessment as soon as possible. The contraction of
research and of agriculture during the nineties in Kazakhstan has probably led to
deterioration of wheat varieties in use in farmers’ fields, through varieties aging and
becoming more pest and disease prone, poor seed management and presence of weed
seeds. Considerable scope probably exists for gains to be made from wheat varietal
improvement in Kazakhstan as a consequence. Gains from improved disease resistance
alone may be sizable. Varieties in farmers’ fields in northern Kazakhstan are not resistant to
leaf rust, stem rust and septoria (Movchan 1998).
The area planted to varieties of wheat in Kazakhstan is not well documented. While the
varieties in fields are known, their relative importance in terms of area grown is not. Scope
exists for a quick low-cost varietal use survey in selected areas to obtain a better
understanding of wheat varieties in use and farmers attitudes towards different varieties.
This should be part of a more substantial diagnostic study in which priorities for wheat
improvement can be set more clearly and baseline data can be compiled.
Agronomic and Crop Management Improvements
A wide array of agronomic and crop management improvements have been tested and
shown to boost yields of wheat in Kazakhstan. The main improvements are:
¨ more timely planting ¨ better crop establishment
¨ better moisture management ¨ weed control
¨ fertilizer application ¨ improved crop rotation.
17 If seed treatment yields 100 kg/ha on farm and the price of wheat is $60/t, the marginal return is $6/ha while the
marginal cost of the treatment is less than $1/ha.33
In considering agronomic and crop management improvements for low-input farming,
careful consideration has to be paid to the costs to farmers of different techniques. Cost-
conscious farmers are going to be very reluctant to adopt changes involving major outlays.
More-timely planting has been shown to improve spring wheat yields in northern
Kazakhstan (Kaskarbayev 1998). Trials over many years indicate the maximum yield of
medium-maturity wheats was obtained with planting between 20-30 May. However,
optimal planting dates for a particular season may differ from this because of the variability
of rainfall and temperature. For more timely planting of wheat, farmers need the
equipment, soil conditions and information about the yield benefits of doing so. Further
research could be conducted to quantify the yield relationship with respect to date of
planting for wheats of different maturity. Knowledge about that relationship is important
for farmers in deciding about timing of operations.
The major cost associated with more timely planting is more-intensive use of the machinery
and labor resources to complete field operations on time. Farmers may also spread planting
dates in a variable environment to reduce risks in their cropping program. Generally costs
of more timely operations are relatively small so long as the better timing can be achieved
without purchase of additional machinery. However timeliness can readily be lost without
reliable equipment and availability of spare parts and mechanics (see next section). One
strategy used by farmers in other countries to improve timeliness of operations is to share
equipment and tasks across several farms with different optimal planting and harvest dates.
Better moisture management involves a number of technologies including minimal tillage,
blade ploughing, crop residue retention, alternative crop rotations, snow planing and
windbreak  crops. The relationship between yield and moisture availability is obvious for
the spring wheat areas of Kazakhstan. The challenge is to develop low-cost methods of
moisture conservation that farmers can employ on a commercial basis. Fallowing generally
adds to spring wheat yields, with average gains in yield of the order of 10-30%, depending
on timing of rainfall in the growing season (Kaskarbayev 1998). As well as grain yield,
important consideration needs to be paid to sustaining levels of soil organic matter and of
soil nutrients when choosing and recommending alternatives for farmers.
Poor plant establishment was reported to be a serious problem in recent years. The poor
quality of land preparation before planting, cost saving during planting and the poor state
of machinery may be important causes. One important method of lowering farmer cost of
growing wheat in a low-input environment is to lower seed planting rates. According to
research reported by Kaskarbayev (1998), yield is not strongly affected by seed rate and
scope may exist to lower this on farm. Further research on saving seed costs and achieving
better plant establishment may deliver a low-cost agronomic improvement for farmers.
Seed costs at trend yields of 700 kg/ha with a planting rate of 120-150 kg/ha represent
about 20% of total output and farmers would be highly likely to adopt technologies saving
on this cost of production.34
Weed populations have grown considerably during the 1990s with reduced use of
herbicides and less cultivation by farmers. Currently, the gains from weed management are
probably quite large in farmers’ wheat fields. Crop rotation is an obvious way to control
weeds at low cost when the opportunity cost of land is low, as it is in Kazakhstan.
Herbicides and additional weed cultivation are more expensive and farmers have shown
during the 1990s that they are hesitant to pay for these methods. Yield gains from weed
management will vary considerably and an average gain is difficult to discern. They are
reported to have averaged about 10% for wheat of Western Siberia (Gamzikov and
Kholmov 1998). Such a gain at trend yields and prices imply an extra return of $6/ha in
Kazakhstan. This would not warrant full herbicide treatment which may cost over $20/ha
(Shegebaev 1998). The economics of herbicide application imply that only when weeds are
serious and potential yield gains from herbicide application are high (about 30% or more) is
it worthwhile for farmers to use herbicides. Other low-cost methods of weed control may
warrant research attention.
Use of fertilizer by farmers is likely to be extremely tight in Kazakhstan for the next few
years, at least. A 15% yield gain is possible with fertilizers in the steppe zone (Gamzikov
and Kholmov 1998). In spring wheat in Kazakhstan this amounts to about 150 kg/ha in a
crop with improved varieties on a low-input cropping system. Generally speaking, farmers
can purchase 1 ton of artificial fertilizer in exchange for 3-4 tons of wheat. This implies that
they are likely to want to see yield gains of at least 8:1 per additional nutrient applied before
applying it. Because of weather variability, such a result cannot always be assured. Research
on spring wheat that is relevant to farmers should be based on low application rates of
fertilizer.
Research has been conducted on alternative crop rotations in Kazakhstan and knowledge of
alternatives amongst farmers and scientists seems high (Kaskarbayev 1998). Further
research in this area might be directed at low-input rotations as alternatives, especially with
livestock and agroforestry being better integrated with cropping. During the Soviet era
specialist monocropping technologies occupied a large area of the steppes (even though a
small proportion of total area). With the move to a less-intensive form of agriculture,
marginal cropping areas may be more profitably devoted to livestock and agroforestry.
Cropping could thus be concentrated in the more favored cropping areas and undertaken in
rotations with technologies that are more sustainable.
Machinery and Productivity Improvements
The aging of machinery and its run-down state is likely to be affecting seriously the on-farm
productivity of wheat in Kazakhstan. With the large areas cropped, tractors, harvesters and
tillage-, planting-, spraying- and grain handling- equipment are all needed for efficient
wheat production. Satybaldin (1998) has highlighted the importance of mechanization and
mechanization policy for Kazakhstan’s farming. He emphasizes the need to upgrade the
stock of machinery, both on farm and for grain processing and recommends that joint
ventures with foreign companies be employed to facilitate this. He also encourages the
development of local manufacturing of certain farm equipment and the amount of
equipment to be replaced in the future would suggest that such a strategy is viable.35
The low rates of investment in machinery are closely related to the overall financial position
of farmers. Thus ability to borrow against farm assets becomes an important consideration
in machinery investment. Farm investment has suffered during the 1990s because farmers
have had extremely limited access to credit at reasonable rates of interest. Policies which
provide greater certainty in the economy generally, including stable prices, low real interest
rates and a general climate of growth and stability will assist farmers to be able to invest in
their enterprises.  Policies which provide sufficient assurance in title to land that banks will
lend money against the  title will also assist farmers in financing machinery and operations.
Improving Marketing and Transport Efficiencies
Considerable scope exists for improving the marketing and, to a lesser extent, transport
efficiencies for wheat in Kazakhstan. This is documented in Satybaldin (1998), Kolobaev
and Nikitina (1998) and Sigarev (1998). The concerns expressed by farmers and farm leaders
of Kazakhstan about the efficiency and fairness of the marketing system during meetings
with them suggest that scope exists for improvement.
As an example of marketing inefficiency, the collapse of farm prices of wheat during 1998
occurred with wheat traders widening their marketing margins considerably. The limited
evidence available to this study suggests that margins widened relative to international
prices by probably US$20/ton from 1997 to 1998.  Such a widening would suggest that
considerable inefficiency exists in the market. 18
Where are the sources of inefficiency in marketing and what can be done to improve it?  To
establish that requires more substantial research on the behavior of the market, especially
on price relationships across different types of wheat, locations, different levels of the
market and times of the marketing season. One source of inefficiency in the wheat market is
a general lack of knowledge and experience in Kazakhstan of the working of modern
international grain markets. Another is a lack of marketing infrastructure and institutions
that would provide the facilities for efficient pricing and marketing activities. Grading of
grain and price premiums for higher quality are an essential part of an efficient wheat
marketing system and should be further developed.
The extent to which the marketing system is concentrated amongst major traders may be a
source of collusion. Does Kazakhstan’s law facilitate the efficient and fair marketing of
grain?  Would antitrust law make the market behave more fairly and efficiently?  There are
a number of institutional and legal questions that should be addressed to improve the
efficiency and fairness of agricultural marketing in Kazakhstan.
Whether Kazakhstan should undertake large-scale strategic storage of wheat to offer a more
reliable supply to customers is worthy of further economic and marketing research. While
storage offers greater certainty of supply to customers, it costs money and/or resources. At
issue is the size of the strategic carryover.
18 Care needs to be taken in drawing too wide a conclusion from this event however. Another explanation of this
widening is that the events in the Russian economy during 1998 created uncertainty and thus broke the link
between international wheat prices and those of Kazakhstan.36
Kazakhstan’s farmers and farm leaders were interested to know more about grain marketing
boards and their evolution in other wheat exporting countries during meetings with them in
1998. Considerable scope exists for Kazakhstan’s grain production and marketing leaders to
be introduced to marketing systems of other countries. Ideas generated from such
interchanges may be very beneficial in improving the grain marketing system of
Kazakhstan. Well-functioning grain marketing boards similar to those working in Canada
and Australia offer some security and fairness to individual farmers in pricing of wheat.
However, generally they will be less efficient than a private marketing system. The tradeoff
between efficiency and fairness thus becomes an important issue in the future direction of
wheat marketing in Kazakhstan.
In the way that Kazakhstan’s farm machinery has aged and not been well-maintained
during the 1990s, the same has occurred for grain storage and processing facilities and for
grain transport equipment, both road and rail. This has probably caused a loss of
productivity of marketing, storage and transport of grain. With the decline in grain output
during the 1990s, the grain transport and storage system has had excess capacity.
Presumably investment in transport and storage equipment will resume when economic
activity strengthens and when the rail and road transport managers see useful returns from
such investment. A perceived recovery in grain production may be necessary before a solid
upturn in investment occurs in this sector, however.
Implications for Research, Extension, Training and Education
Need for a Cultural Change
Kazakhstan’s wheat sector in the late 1990s is reflecting the fundamental change in
incentives and in values that were adopted when the nation became independent in 1991.
The ending of the Soviet system and the adoption of a more market-oriented economy called
for many adjustments to be made and for the formation of new institutions and ways of
doing business in the economy and in agriculture. Through sheer necessity, farmers have
been relatively quick to adapt to the new system. The research, extension, training and
education sectors have faced strong pressures to change also and have done so under tight
budget constraints.
Farmers have cut back the intensity of agricultural production dramatically during the
1990s. In doing so they have positioned agriculture to use farm inputs and resources much-
less intensively and much-more competitively than a decade ago. The land is less heavily
stocked, less ploughing and monocropping of land is occurring now and the energy-
intensive agro-industrial complexes of the Soviet era have been trimmed considerably. These
changes have not been without hardship and uncertainty for Kazakhstan’s farmers nor for
those supporting the agricultural sector through research, education and other contributions.
The analysis in this study suggests that the input-intensive method of farming in
Kazakhstan that was developed during the Soviet era is not competitive under the market-
based system now prevailing. If this is correct and applicable across other agricultural crops
and livestock, there are major implications for future strategies towards agricultural37
research, extension, training and education in Kazakhstan. A fundamental change in
attitudes is suggested for agriculture as a consequence. Since most of the research and
education that has accumulated in Kazakhstan over many years was undertaken within a
more-intensive Soviet agricultural system, the knowledge and thinking now has to be recast
and adapted to be relevant to conditions of farming today and in the future.
During meetings with various agricultural agencies, farmers and farm leaders in late 1998,
two important attitudes were observed. First, there was a negative mood about agriculture.
The contraction of agriculture, lack of investment, decline in agricultural research funding
and so on were looked upon with considerable concern. Second, there was a strong longing
for the past. Many people expressed sadness about the changes of the 1990s and stated
concerns about the future of agriculture in Kazakhstan. Some clearly stated that farming in
the Soviet era was better. The 1998 drought and low grain prices of the time undoubtedly
colored the mood of the meetings. However, the attitudes revealed have a strong message
for future strategies for research, extension, education and training.
For the future, Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector needs a major change of attitudes amongst
farmers, researchers and others supporting and doing business within the sector. A major
cultural change is needed. As well, a major improvement in morale is needed.  Leaders of
agriculture need to develop strategies that will alter attitudes and develop a positive and
forward-looking approach to Kazakhstan’s agriculture. This needs to occur with education
as well as research so that the future leaders of Kazakhstan’s agriculture are forward-
looking, positive and well-trained to address the needs of farming in the 21st Century.
Implications for Wheat Research
The most important implication for future wheat research is Kazakhstan’s farmers are likely
to be very reluctant to spend money and resources on farm inputs. Generally, they will be
employing low-input technologies. As a consequence, the priorities for research should be
to develop technologies that are low-cost to farmers and that will deliver high rates of
return for small investments by farmers. Wherever possible, technologies that can save on
inputs in a sustainable manner, such as reducing the planting density of seed for wheat, will
be preferred to the high-input technologies that prevailed during the Soviet era. Crop
protection technologies, for example, which deliver solutions at low cost to farmers are
likely to be more readily adopted than high-cost options. Calling for farmers to move to a
more-intensive form of agriculture in the near future is likely to be futile. The reality is that
farmers now have to pay market prices for inputs and they are simply doing their best to
pursue their objectives under the risky and market-driven situation now faced (and likely
in the future).
Past research in Kazakhstan will offer considerable information of value for low-input
agriculture. The challenge for scientists will be to infer as much as possible from the
information that is relevant to the new conditions of agriculture. In designing strategic
research programs, careful consideration should be given to building knowledge in areas
that are relevant to low-input farming. Use should be made of joint research with CIMMYT
and other international centers to develop and promote the low-cost technologies for wheat
in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s wheat scientists may profitably learn a lot from other low-38
input wheat production sectors, especially Canada, Australia, and the drier wheat lands of
the USA, Argentina, and relevant areas of Asia and Europe. The large body of knowledge
from these sources will prove very useful in shaping future directions for wheat research in
Kazakhstan and should be reviewed extensively, perhaps in collaboration with scientists
from the different countries.
A program of collaborative research has already been mapped involving Kazakhstan’s
wheat programs, CIMMYT, ICARDA and selected American universities (Morgounov et al.
1998, Appendix 1). This program reflects the differences between the spring wheat research
needs and the winter wheat ones. For both areas, farmers are likely to be tight in use of
inputs, although this will vary according to moisture availability, soil type, and other
farming circumstances. When farmers are likely to be able to resume investing in equipment
and new technologies will depend on general economic conditions, seasonal conditions,
prices of wheat, and credit conditions for farmers. Wheat researchers would be prudent to
assume that investment is likely to pick up only very slowly in the next few years. Beyond
that some improvement in investment is likely.
This study suggests that high priority for wheat research should be varietal improvement
and work on other technologies that are likely to be adopted at low cost. Any cost-saving
techniques such as reducing planting rates and employing rotations to minimize weed and
disease problems are likely to be looked on favorably by farmers. In contrast, technologies
involving intensive use of inputs are likely to be adopted only in those areas where
moisture levels and related yields assure farmers of a reasonable return on their investment.
Research on intensifying wheat growing in the spring wheat areas  should be a very low
priority and re-oriented to other more relevant opportunities.
Wheat research needs to address the issue of sustaining the use of soils and other natural
resources in Kazakhstan. This calls for a longer-term research program which should be
integrated with other crops and livestock programs, as well as those for agroforestry and
natural resources more generally. These programs should be also based on the assumption
of that Kazakhstan’s land resources will be used less-intensively in the future than under
the Soviet era. All wheat researchers need to be conscious of the underlying principles of
sustaining the soils and other natural resources.
Related to this is the need for a much-more commercially-oriented analysis of weather
developments for researchers, farmers and grain exporters in Kazakhstan and neighboring
regions. Meteorological data are difficult to obtain in Kazakhstan currently and a much
more-accessible and commercially-oriented service is needed for agriculture. The methods
of climatological research employed in low-rainfall and risky climates in other parts of the
world could usefully be adopted and employed in Kazakhstan.
Implications for Wheat Marketing and Economic Research
Considerable technical research on wheat marketing and processing has been undertaken in
Kazakhstan. However, there is a strong need for this to be matched by commercial research
on wheat marketing. This research should have a Central Asian focus. The marketing
research suggested includes the following:39
¨ analysis of flows of grain geographically and via alternative transport routes
¨ analysis of costs of different marketing, storage and transport activities and comparisons
with international best-practice
¨ analysis of price behavior within markets spatially, between qualities and over time
¨ assessing the efficiency of the wheat market of Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries
¨ assessing the degree of concentration in grain marketing and ways of minimizing anti-
competitive behavior, including legal and institutional changes
¨ analysis of potential for an improved set of grades of wheat and related price premiums
¨ reviewing and improving collection and dissemination of market information
¨ improving crop forecasting methods
¨ analysis of the potential for a modern fully-private grain marketing board to provide
farmers with an alternative market outlet.
Such work should be given high priority and undertaken in parallel with the agricultural
research. Without the development of agricultural marketing in Kazakhstan, attempts to
encourage farmers to grow more wheat could prove hollow.
Economic research is also needed. This study should be followed up with more extensive
study of policies and their impact on wheat production and on other crops and livestock.
This could be conducted as providing estimates of producer subsidy equivalents and policy
effects in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian agriculture.
 A number of other important economic studies could be pursued, including:
¨ diagnostic study and baseline study of wheat production in selected locations of
Kazakhstan
¨ assessing impact of new wheat technologies and returns to wheat research in Kazakhstan
¨ improving the title to land to provide assurance to the credit market for Kazakhstan’s
agriculture
¨ economics of alternative technologies for sustaining agricultural production in
Kazakhstan
¨ medium-term prospects for grain and livestock production in Central Asia
¨ implications of growth of the energy resources sector and  inter-sectoral competition for
the agricultural sector of Kazakhstan
¨ implications of uncertainties and developments in Russia for Kazakhstan’s agriculture
¨ potential export market developments and related economics of exporting to different
markets
¨ potential for strategic storage of wheat in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.40
Implications for Education, Training and Extension
Education, training and extension needs also to be reshaped and better-oriented to the
reality of farming in Kazakhstan today and for the future. The principles and ideas taught at
university need to be re-shaped to be relevant to the market-oriented system of agriculture.
Of particular importance in higher education is the teaching of agricultural business and
finance, marketing, economics and policy to students so that they appreciate the changes in
the commercial conditions facing farmers and the needs of a commercial agricultural sector.
Technical courses undertaken by university students should be re-focused so that they learn
about research and development methods that are relevant to a low-input commercial
agriculture. The technical students need to be taught actively on how to assess research
opportunities and to work with farmers and businesses in R&D for agriculture. Training in
aspects of sustaining the soils and natural resource base of Kazakhstan is also high priority.
Training and extension for farmers and technicians needs to be re-focused to be very
practical and relevant to farmer conditions faced today and for the future. Considerable
commercial training is required and should be given high priority in training about new
technologies. It is especially important that those providing training offer forward-looking
perspectives on Kazakhstan’s agriculture. They must encourage farmers to continue to
adopt new and innovative low-cost ways of growing and marketing wheat in the country.
Old ways of calculating cost of production should be abandoned and farmer budgeting and
other decision making tools to help farmers implemented. A useful starting would be a
“Farm Management Handbook” following the models of Nix (1989), Chadwick (1989) and
Ahmad, Hussain and Longmire (1989).
Because Kazakhstan needs to build the institutions for a more market-oriented and low-
input wheat industry, those involved in education, training and extension should be
exposed much more to what is done in other parts of the world. Thus they should be
supported to interchange actively with wheat industries in Canada, Australia, parts of the
USA and other parts of the world where the wheat industry is market-oriented and employs
low-input technologies. This interchange should include visits, conferences and seminar
attendance as well as focused study tours and study leave.
To facilitate such interchange, English language training should be offered to young
scientists and educators and email and internet links provided at key locations for the
educational and training community. Scientists, economists and educators from other parts
of the world should be encouraged to undertake study visits to Kazakhstan to assist in
building capacity in agriculture.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
Policy makers have set Kazakhstan on a path of commercialization in expectation that
future efficiency gains and improvements in the use of the nation’s resources along with
more freedom for individuals and the nation will more than compensate the adjustment
costs involved. This is a long-term process and may take at least twenty years (Fischer,
Sahay and Vegh 1998). The Kazakhstan economy returned to growth in 1996 after almost
contracting to half the reported GDP prior to independence. Agriculture declined after41
19 Overall productivity may be 20-30% below what could be achieved with adoption of improved varieties, lower
planting rates, seed treatment and other cost-saving or low-cost improvements to wheat production and
marketing.
independence but there are signs that this phase has ended, although the 1998 drought and
Russia’s economic uncertainty may cause some further contraction in 1999.
Several policy implications flow from this study. The first and most important is that
Kazakhstan’s agriculture has changed fundamentally during the 1990s, because farmers have
faced a market-oriented and commercial situation. The scaling back of agriculture to a much-
less intensive form of production, for both grains and livestock, has been dramatic.
Commercial pressures have encouraged farmers to move away from the energy and input-
intensive methods of farming of the Soviet era. These methods are no longer competitive and
are unlikely to become competitive again.
The collapse of  investment in farming during the 1990s has caused wheat productivity to fall
in Kazakhstan.19 This suggests considerable potential exists for improving wheat
productivity now. Investment in farming is likely to pick up only slowly in the next few years
but the medium-run outlook for investment is better. Thus short-term productivity
improvements must be low-cost or cost-saving for farmers and the marketing system.
With regard to the wheat sector, several policy recommendations flow from this study. First,
the research, extension, training and education sectors servicing agriculture have faced
extremely tight funding in recent years. There is a need for these important sectors to be
better funded, through government revenue and through other means. Ways should be
found to fund part of the activities of these sectors from research levies applied to sales of
grain or food products within Kazakhstan. With an efficient marketing system, the benefits of
research will flow primarily to farmers of Kazakhstan (Edwards and Freebairn 1981). Thus a
levy at the wholesale level (of say 1% of all grain sold) could be collected to partially fund
research and related activities that will benefit farmers through increased productivity.
Kazakhstan has witnessed considerable decline in productivity in the wheat sector during the
1990s, indicated by the sharp decline in yields. There is a strong need to reverse this decline.
Government needs to play an important role in offering leadership to the research, extension,
training, seed, farming, marketing and processing sectors to improve products, technologies
and productivity. People need to be encouraged to think strategically towards the future of
their businesses and research and support activities. Such strategic thinking should not
involve bureaucratic strategic planning exercises. It should involve developing strategies
which are relevant to the new low-input agriculture which is evolving in Kazakhstan.
A special program of re-invigorating the farm sector is needed. Every means possible should
be devoted to supporting farmers and others to develop the low-cost and low-input
technologies that will be needed to regenerate production. This should be done at the same
time that changes are made to policy to improve the commercial conditions of farming. No
attempt should be made to take Kazakhstan’s agriculture back to the energy and input-
intensive systems of the Soviet era.42
Title to land remains uncertain in Kazakhstan. For this reason the credit market is not
working satisfactorily for farmers. They use barter and probably pay high implicit interest
rates as a consequence. Further investigation and improvement of the land title system is
needed to ensure that the farm sector is able to function efficiently and with greater
certainty in the future. Improvements in the land title arrangements will encourage more
investment by farmers which will flow on to regenerate the rural economy and make it
more productive.
Considerable development is needed in the agricultural marketing systems of Kazakhstan.
Marketing research and development should be undertaken so that Kazakhstan can
progress towards an efficient and fairer system of agricultural marketing. Currently, farmers
believe that the system is unfair and dominated by a small number of traders who may be
colluding. Government has an important responsibility to ensure that markets work
competitively and should penalize heavily those who practice anti-competitive behavior.
Trade practices legislation, anti-trust legislation or national competition policy should be
enacted and implemented to ensure that severe penalties apply to those practicing anti-
competitive behavior.
Kazakhstan’s government and farmer bodies might investigate a role for a modern fully-
private grain marketing board and for the further development of commercial arms to
farmer associations to provide more balanced market power in the grain and input markets.
However, there is unlikely to be a case for intervention in the wheat market by government.
Those growing wheat and others involved with the industry need to know that they will be
operating in a commercial environment which is stable, consistent, efficient and fair within
the law. That way farmers and others involved with agriculture in Kazakhstan will best be
able to cope with the inevitable changes ahead. The future for wheat in Kazakhstan over the
medium term is promising. However, many changes are needed, especially change in the
mindsets, culture, and approaches of those working in and supporting the wheat industry
and conducting research, training, and education for its future.43
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